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As businesses in many industries adopt the platform business model, many aspects of the 
traditional business are going through a shake-up, including competition and strategies for gaining 
competitive advantage. When platforms are competing with each other, the network effects due to 
having a strong installed base create a strategic advantage and shape the competition. Additionally, 
another level of competition in the world of platforms is between complementors on a given 
platform which is also influenced by the presence of the network effects. In the three studies of 
this dissertation, we focus on competitive strategies for digital platform businesses. In the first 
essay, we look at competition between platforms and examine the emergence of Winners-Take-
Some (WTS) market outcome in IT platform markets, where such markets are expected to yield a 
Winner-Takes-All (WTA) outcome. We use the cyclical video game console market as an 
appropriate context to investigate the influential factors in the market outcome in platform markets. 
We find a consistent increase in multi-homing among the most popular video-games that can pave 
the way for the emergence of WTS outcome. In the second essay, we are turning our focus to the 
strategies that platforms can adopt to improve emerging success metrics such as user engagement. 
We examine how digital content platforms can improve users’ engagement by providing 
popularity information signals. We evaluate the effect of conflicting and aligned information 
signals on users’ engagement in the context of music content platforms. We find that conflicting 
popularity information signals are more effective in increasing user engagement than the aligned 
popularity information signals. In the third essay and in the context of mobile app platforms, we 
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focus on the competition between complementors. We study the role of app category 
characteristics on the performance of mobile app developers who offer apps in those categories 
and strive to gain competitive advantage. We evaluate category concentration and category 
popularity as two important factors and find that respectively, they negatively and positively 
influence new app’s performance for a given developer. We find that the negative effect of 
category concentration is stronger than the positive effect of category popularity.  
 
Keywords: digital platforms, competitive strategies, network effects, winners-take-some, user 
engagement, app category characteristics  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, the platform revolution has transformed the business world. Platforms enable 
interactions between two (or more) sides of a market, mainly complementors and consumers, and 
they rely on facilitating the exchanges between the multiple sides of the market to create value. As 
businesses in many industries adopt the platform business model, many aspects of traditional 
business are going through a shake-up, including competition and strategies for gaining 
competitive advantage.  
The change in the nature of the competition in the world of platforms is partly due to the 
presence of network effects.	With the positive indirect or cross-side network effects, the value 
created for participants on one side of the platform increases as there are more participants on the 
other side of the platform. On the other hand, competition effect due to an overcrowded presence 
of complementors can create a glut of complementors and heightened competition. In that case, 
the increase in number of strong incumbents    on one side can result in decreased value for all the 
participants on the same side.  
At the platform level and when platforms are competing with each other, network effects 
due to having a strong installed base can create a strategic advantage and shape the competition 
(Katz and Shapiro 1985; Rochet and Tirole 2003). However, there are factors that can attenuate 
network effects and consequently alter the course of competition between platforms, such as 
prevalence of multi-homing (Armstrong 2006; Doganoglu and Wright 2006). In the first essay of 
this dissertation, we study the competition among platforms and investigate how the prevalence of 
multi-homing affects market outcomes. 
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In the first essay and in chapter two, we look at competition between platforms and examine 
the emergence of a Winners-Take-Some (WTS) market outcome in IT platform markets. In such 
markets, market outcome expectation based on both academic research and marketplace has been 
a Winner-Takes-All (WTA) outcome, i.e. a single dominant market leader with more than 50% of 
the market share (Eisenmann et al. 2006; Gawer and Cusumano 2002; Katz and Shapiro 1985; 
Shapiro and Varian 1999).  
But in recent years, a disruption in this trend has been observed in some networked markets, 
where no single platform holds a dominant share, resulting in a WTS outcome (Bresnahan et al. 
2015; Liu et al. 2012). For platform owners, whether a WTA or WTS outcome is expected in a 
market competition, the strategic decisions they make and the competitive strategies they adopt 
are likely to be different. With a WTA outcome, more up-front subsidization for winning early 
market share is advised. But with a WTS outcome, platform owners need to have less up-front 
subsidization and fight in the market rather than for the market (Kemerer et al. 2013).  
We use the cyclical video game console market as an appropriate context to investigate 
influential factors in the market outcome that can bring about a WTS. Evaluating these factors, 
prior works suggest the importance of multi-homing in weakening the network effects in platform 
markets which can pave the way for a WTS outcome (Bresnahan et al. 2015; Corts and Lederman 
2009; Rochet and Tirole 2003) . Building on prior studies and using three sets of data, we 
empirically test the hypothesis that an increase in multi-homing of the most-popular complements 
has shaped the market in this competition to yield a WTS outcome. We find that 65% of the most-
popular games in the Internet Class are multi-homing, a distinct increase from prior competitions. 
We argue that this increase is likely due to changes in the cost structure of software game 
development, as well as the increasingly downloadable nature of the games.   
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In the world of platforms, the platform businesses compete with each other by adopting 
strategies that encourage more participation on both sides of the market and allow for more value 
creation. This is important due to the presence of network effects: as participation and activity on 
one side of the platform increases, the gain and value for participants on the other side of the 
platform increases (Farrell and Klemperer 2007). One such strategy is to enhance the design of the 
platform to better equip users with their required information with the goal of improving their 
engagement with the platform. In the second essay of this dissertation, we study the design of 
platforms and how informational signals can increase the users’ engagement on the platform.  
In the second essay and in chapter three, we are turning our focus to the strategies platforms 
adopt to gain competitive advantage, and in particular the strategy of enhancing the design of the 
platforms. The platform markets literature suggests that for content platforms (i.e. platforms 
enabling the exchange of content), user engagement is an emerging success metric and that 
improving user engagement can help platforms gain a competitive advantage. To invoke such 
desired user behavior, research literature suggests that platforms can take an active role and 
disseminate information signals (e.g. in the form of ratings, reviews, etc.) to the users (Aral et al. 
2013; Godes et al. 2005).  
In this study, we examine how information signals accompanying content can influence 
user engagement in content platforms. These information signals can be aligned with each other 
or in conflict with each other, thereby influencing user engagement differently.  To better 
understand these effects, we draw from the information foraging theory and social foraging model 
that explain a user’s behavior in an information search environment similar to a content platform 
(Pirolli 2009; Pirolli and Card 1999). In these environments, heterogeneity of information signals 
3
		
	
can reduce the redundancy of received information by a user, increase their discovery of content 
on the platform and result in more user engagement.  
We hypothesize that in content platforms, since conflicting signals are more heterogeneous 
than aligned signals, they are more effective in increasing user engagement than aligned signals. 
We test our hypothesis in a randomized field experiment in the context of music content platform, 
using popularity of songs as information signals. The results of this field experiment show when 
users are exposed to conflicting signals, they are more engaged with the platform than when they 
are exposed to no information signal or aligned information signals.  
Due to the presence of network effects on platforms, the locus of value creation changes 
from inside the firm to outside the firm, and consequently the focus of organizational attention 
shifts from inside to outside. As a result, platform companies redefine organizational boundaries 
by building external ecosystems where value is created (Parker et al. 2016). In an ecosystem, 
participation of partners (or complementors) creates value for both the platform and the partners. 
In such ecosystems, another level of competition surfaces between complementors on a given 
platform as they compete to improve their performance and gain a competitive advantage over 
other complementors. In the third essay of this dissertation and in the context of mobile app 
platforms, we study the role of app category characteristics in how complementors can improve 
the performance of their products.  
The third piece of this dissertation in chapter four focuses on the competitive strategies that 
complementors adopt in order to succeed on a platform. The context of this study is mobile app 
platforms, where mobile app developers (as complementors) adopt a myriad of strategies to 
improve their performance. One such strategy is diversification of app offerings across different 
app categories. In adopting this strategy, the choice of for which app categories to develop is not 
4
		
	
a trivial decision, as it may have consequences for how well the app will be adopted and 
downloaded by the users. The success of the newly released apps is in part dependent on the 
characteristics of the app categories they are offered in. Prior works in other industries have 
examined how features of product markets can improve or impede the performance of firms and 
their newly introduced products. These characteristics include competition within a product-
market and the popularity of product-market based on the demand for it (Boudreau 2010; Cennamo 
and Santalo 2010; Markovich and Moenius 2009; Simonsohn 2010). Since the mobile app platform 
is a networked market, these two forces can significantly influence the performance of a newly 
released app. The category concentration increases as the competition becomes more intense and 
more strong incumbents are present in a mobile app category, leading to a glut of developers 
(Boudreau 2012). Category popularity increases as there is more demand for the apps in a category, 
triggering an indirect positive network effect (Venkatraman and Lee 2004). Given the tension 
between these two opposing forces, Venkatraman and Lee raise the need for further investigation 
into these two effects, and their trade-off.  
We hypothesize that two opposing category characteristics, the popularity of the category 
and the concentration of the category, can differently influence the app’s performance and thus the 
diversification outcome of the developer. Our analysis of a panel data set of mobile apps on Google 
Play, the leading app store for Android mobile phones, provides support for the hypothesis. The 
results also show that the negative effect of category concentration overwhelms the positive effect 
of category popularity in influencing the performance of a newly released app as measured by 
number of downloads. 
In chapter five, we conclude this dissertation by reviewing the summary of findings and 
their implications for platform business. The research questions studied in this dissertation provide 
5
		
	
opportunities for further examining the competitive strategies in the world of platforms. We 
provide details of future works that will extend and address the limitations of this dissertation.  
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2.0 WINNERS-TAKE-SOME DYNAMICS WITHIN DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY 
MARKETS: A REEXAMINATION OF THE VIDEO GAME CONSOLE WARS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Platform markets, where an intermediary facilitates transactions among two or more types of 
agents (e.g., complementors and consumers), have historically been competitive battlefields 
among platform owners.  Typically, these competitions have yielded a dominant market leader 
who captures significantly more than 50% of the market share.  In such markets, the eventual 
winner typically enjoys increasing returns to scale and high profitability. Thus, at the inception 
of such a market, platform owners attempt to rapidly expand the network on each side of the 
market, often at great cost (e.g., due to price subsidies). Managers have taken note of this process 
and are motivated to position their own products to become the winning standard in emerging 
platform markets (Eisenmann et al. 2006). 
However, the expected outcome of a single platform owner achieving market dominance, 
the so-called “Winner-Takes-All” (hereafter “WTA”) result, has been challenged in recent 
platform market competitions.  Instances of a different pattern of competition where no single 
winner emerges include the markets for digital flash memory cards, digital media files, digital 
image files and mobile operating systems (Bresnahan et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2012). In these 
markets, the competitions have not resulted in a single dominant winner, but rather a “Winners-
Take-Some” (hereafter “WTS”) outcome, in which multiple platform owners survive the 
competition and each win a substantial, but non-dominant, share of the market.   
Are these WTS results indicative of a change in the prevailing dynamics for platform 
markets such that WTA is no longer the expectation? Understanding whether a fundamental shift 
has occurred is of particular interest to managers involved in such markets. If WTA is not to be 
7
	expected, then the dominant strategy may call for less up-front subsidization and other costs 
associated with the attempt to win early market share. If WTS is now more likely to be the 
prevailing outcome for platform markets, then such technology platforms may need to be 
positioned to fight in the market (as with traditional products), rather than fighting for the market 
as managers of WTA products have been encouraged to do (Kemerer et al. 2013).   
This research seeks to aid our understanding of whether fundamental changes in platform 
market dynamics are occurring. To that end, we empirically re-examine an oft-studied context 
that has resulted in numerous competitions over time: home video game console competitions.  
This market has followed a generational pattern, with new technology and new platform 
introductions resulting in numerous successive competitions. Further, these competitions, when 
consistently classified and analyzed, had, prior to the most recently concluded competition, 
yielded a single winner with dominant market share in each generational classification. 
Understanding why this most recent competition, unlike those that preceded it, yielded a WTS 
outcome illuminates our research problem, providing useful guidelines for adjusting expectations 
for both current and future platform markets.   
The video game console market competitions are a useful context for study for other 
reasons as well.  In addition to the clear economic value of the industry and its products — DFC 
Intelligence estimated the industry would surpass $100 billion in 2018 (DFC Intelligence 2016) 
— the industry has been shown to be a useful specimen for examining a number of digital 
business-related topics, including  network effects and complementary goods, as well as platform  
markets (Armstrong 2006; Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Economides 1996; Farrell and Saloner 
1986; Gallagher and Park 2002; Katz and Shapiro 1985; Rochet and Tirole 2003).  In addition, 
the cyclical nature of the industry, brought on by the rapid technological obsolescence of its 
8
	platforms, provides a number of natural experiments in a short period of time in which to study 
these phenomena.   
In evaluating these competitions among video game consoles we observe an important 
change in complementors’ multi-homing behavior (i.e., development for more than one platform) 
that may have led to this recent WTS outcome.  Multi-homing among video game developers has 
increased substantially — in the most recently concluded competition 65% of the most popular 
games were available on competitive consoles, the first competition in which this number has 
ever exceeded half of the market. We argue that this has contributed to the emergence of a WTS 
outcome in the most recently concluded competition.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as followed. Section II reviews the literature on 
platform markets, multi-homing and research on video game consoles. In Section III we propose 
an objective schema for an analysis of video game platform market, as well as for the analysis of 
multi-homing in the Internet Class. We present a summary of our findings and discussion in 
Section IV, and Section V summarizes and suggests future research directions.   
 
 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.2.1 Platform markets  
A platform market is a market in which an intermediary (the platform) enables interaction 
between two separate entities on at least two sides of the market1 (Eisenmann et al. 2006; Katz 
and Shapiro 1985; Rochet and Tirole 2003) (See Figure 1). Examples of these markets include 
																																																						
1 There is a significant amount of literature that describes this as a “two-sided market”.  More 
current work identifies these as “platform markets”, an umbrella term which includes two-sided 
markets, and it is this current nomenclature that is used here.   
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	PC operating systems (enabling interaction between consumers and application developers), 
employment websites (enabling interaction between job-seekers and employers), and video game 
consoles (enabling interaction between video game players and game developers) (Eisenmann et 
al. 2006). These markets are further characterized by the presence of positive cross-side network 
effects, by which the net utility on one side of the market (e.g., consumers of video games) 
increases as the number of adopters on the other side of the market (e.g., complementors such as 
video game developers) increases (Rochet and Tirole 2006). This creates a chicken-and-egg 
problem for platform owners who need to be attentive to both sides of the market in order to 
make their network grow (Rochet and Tirole 2003). 
  
   
 
In evaluating the competitions within technology platform markets over the last few 
decades both academic research and marketplace results have fostered an expectation for the 
emergence of a dominant standard (Eisenmann et al. 2006; Gawer and Cusumano 2002; Katz 
and Shapiro 1985; Shapiro and Varian 1999). VHS, Microsoft Windows, eBay, PayPal, and Blu-
Ray DVD are all examples of products that went on to dominate their respective platform 
markets. As has occurred in numerous networked markets, each example involved a season of 
conflict in which multiple, seemingly viable candidates contended for adopters before, finally, a 
single winner emerged with a dominant majority of the market share (Varian and Shapiro 1999). 
This trend of observing a WTA outcome, however, has been disrupted in some more recent 
competitions where no clear standard has arisen. Among flash memory cards, for instance, a 
number of formats initially competed, and multiple standards prevailed (Liu et al. 2012). 
	Complementors		 	Consumers		Platform		
 
Figure 1. A Platform Market with Two-Sides 
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	Similarly, on web pages, a number of image formats (e.g., .gif, .jpg, .png) can be found, with 
none of them holding a dominant share, and hence the emergence of a WTS outcome.   
 
2.2.2 Multi-homing  
Another key attribute of platform market competitions is the decision of adopters whether or not 
to multi-home, meaning they adopt more than one of the platforms engaged in a competition 
(Rochet and Tirole 2003). In a two-sided platform market both sides of the market (i.e., 
consumer and complementor) can choose to either single-home (i.e., adopt one and only one 
platform) or to multi-home. In the video game console context a consumer can choose to adopt 
only one console within a given competition (single-homing) or might instead adopt multiple 
consoles (multi-homing; e.g., can buy and use both an Xbox 360 and a PlayStation 3). Similarly, 
complement providers may single-home (by creating platform-exclusive content) or multi-home 
(by developing content for more than one competing platform)2. This research shows that, where 
multi-homing costs are high, a single platform is more likely to win the market (WTA), and, 
where they are lower, a WTS outcome is more likely, all else being equal.  
Prior economic literature has found multi-homing to be a significant factor in determining 
the price structure and dynamics of platform markets and their competitive outcomes. Rochet 
and Tirole (2003) found that when more buyers (i.e., consumers) multi-home, the result is a more 
favorable price structure for the sellers (i.e., complement providers) (Rochet and Tirole 2003). 
Armstrong (2006) argued that the decision of agents in a platform market to either single-home 
or multi-home is one of the determinant factors influencing the structures of prices offered to 
																																																						
2 Some studies use software exclusivity or software incompatibility to refer to the opposite of 
multi-homing on the complementor side (i.e. here termed single-homing) (Corts and Lederman 
2009; Lee 2013; Mantena et al. 2007) 
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	both sides of the market (Armstrong 2006).  Doganoglu and Wright argue that multi-homing 
makes firms less likely to make their network compatible, even when it is efficient to do so. 
Furthermore, although multi-homing can make compatibility more socially desirable, it makes it 
less likely for firms to choose network compatibility (Doganoglu and Wright 2006).  Rysman 
found that when measured as holding credit cards from different networks (as opposed to using 
credit cards from different networks), multi-homing is more prevalent (Rysman 2007). Farrell 
and Klemperer describe how multi-homing practices weaken the network effects in different 
industries with two-sided markets, such as the market for video recordings, sound recordings and 
telecommunications (Farrell and Klemperer 2007). 
Another factor that can weaken the network effects and make a WTS outcome more 
likely is the presence of low-cost conversion technologies (Liu et al. 2012). In the market of 
digital flash memory cards, no tipping to one format or standard was observed. This WTS 
outcome is attributed to wide adoption of converters acting as “gateway technologies” between 
multiple formats (David and Bunn 1988). The provision of converters reduces consumer 
perception of the value of network effects by allowing them to choose a flash memory card 
format with a smaller installed base without worrying about compatibility costs (Liu et al. 2012). 
Most recently Bresnahan et al. show that in the two-sided market of mobile operating 
system platforms, the multi-homing of more attractive and highly demanded apps can cause a 
fragmented market structure, in other words, a WTS equilibrium (Bresnahan et al. 2015) . Their 
model proposes that the non-tipping structure of the market can be explained by allowing for 
heterogeneity of app attractiveness to customers.  The authors suggest that app demand is highly 
concentrated, and that a small subset of highly attractive apps will be in higher demand by 
customers, regardless of the platform.  Due to high demand, such app developers find it 
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	profitable to supply to both (or all) platforms and to multi-home across platforms. The model 
suggests that, if an adequate number of attractive apps multi-home, then the stable market 
structure will be in a fragmented equilibrium, i.e., a WTS outcome. The model is tested 
empirically with data collected on developers’ platform choices and app and developer 
characteristics, as well as from commercial data on app usage. The empirical data supports this 
model, showing that since more attractive and highly demanded apps multi-home, the 
fragmented structure of the mobile app platform market is stable and no tipping will occur 
(Bresnahan et al. 2015)3.  
 
2.2.3 Video game consoles 
 
The video game console industry is a popular context for academic study (see Table 1 for a 
chronologically-ordered summary of video game console research), starting at least with 
Gallagher and Park’s highly cited 2002 survey of video game console market dynamics in IEEE 
Transactions on Engineering Management (Gallagher and Park 2002)4. Other research has 
utilized the home video game console market context to investigate the platform success 
dynamics based on complement sales (Shankar and Bayus 2003), complement number and 
variety (Clements and Ohashi 2005; Srinivasan and Venkatraman 2010), complement quality 
(Corts and Lederman 2009; Iansiti and Zhu 2007; Zhou 2011), customer expectations regarding 
future complement availability and quality (Dubé et al. 2010; Iansiti and Zhu 2007), complement 
exclusivity (Lee 2013; Srinivasan and Venkatraman 2010), market concentration among 
																																																						
3 Bresnahan et al.’s observations about mobile applications’ multi-homing behavior are further 
supported by recent work highlighting the software tools available to reduce the cost of this 
practice (Jiang 2016).  
4 We note that some earlier research (e.g., Dermer 1992) also uses video game consoles as 
examples. 
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	complements (Lee 2013), customer heterogeneity (Liu et al. 2010; Zhou 2011), and technical 
qualities of the platform itself (Derdenger 2014; Gretz 2010). In addition, the market has been 
used to assess the importance of platform technical qualities in determining complementors’ 
market entry (Zhou 2011)5. 
Prior studies have examined how the characteristics of the video games themselves 
(quality, popularity, and exclusivity) affect the market for video game consoles and its dynamics 
(Corts and Lederman 2009; Kim et al. 2014; Lee 2013; Prieger and Hu 2012). Historically, in the 
video game market multi-homing had not been a common practice since developing for multiple 
platforms meant re-programming games to work on those platforms, as well as incurring costs to 
manufacture and warehouse game cartridges.  However, the composition of game development 
costs has changed, which can be hypothesized to increase the relative attractiveness for game 
developers to multi-home their games. Middleware “engines”, which enable developers to more 
easily and inexpensively replicate graphic rendering and game behavior across platforms, have 
become more common (Jiang 2016; Sherr 2013).  
																																																						
5 The home video game console market has existed since the early 1970s when various 
companies released home video game consoles (e.g., the Magnavox Odyssey). While the earliest 
consoles were limited to pre-loaded game content hard-wired into the console itself, in the mid- 
to late-1970s console platforms, such as the Atari 2600 (VCS) began to appear. The functionality 
of these newer platforms could be extended through the purchase of additional complementary 
content (i.e., video game cartridges).  Since then, video game consoles have formed a platform 
market, where manufacturers build and sell the console, while primarily third parties develop and 
sell games that can be played on that console (Rochet and Tirole 2003).  
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Table 1. Video Game Console Markets Literature Review 
 
Author(s) Title Journal 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Platform Market Factors 
Network Effects Pricing/Su
bsidy 
Other 
Concepts Buyer-Side Seller-Side 
Gallagher 
and Park 
(2002) 
Innovation and 
Competition in 
Standard-Based 
Industries: A 
Historical Analysis 
of the US Home 
Video Game 
Market 
IEEE 
Transactions 
on 
Engineering 
Management 
Market 
Winners 
(Anecdotal) 
Discussed Anecdotal Price Cuts 
(Anecdotal) 
Improvement 
in Graphics, 
Switching 
Cost 
Shankar 
and Bayus 
(2003) 
Network Effects 
and Competition: 
An Empirical 
Analysis of the 
Home Video Game 
Industry 
Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
Sales (in 
Dollars) 
 Sales of Top 
10 Game 
Titles, Impact 
of Network 
Size 
    
Venkatram
an and Lee 
(2004) 
Preferential 
Linkage and 
Network 
Evolution: A 
Conceptual Model 
and Empirical Test 
in the US Video 
Game Sector 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
Complementor 
Decision to 
Develop for a 
Platform 
  (DV)     
Clements 
and Ohashi 
(2005) 
Indirect Network 
Effects and the 
Product Cycle: 
Video Games in 
the US, 1994-2002 
Journal of 
Industrial 
Economics 
Units Sold Cumulative 
Unit Sales 
(Prior to 
1994) 
Complementor 
Decision to 
Adopt 
Platform 
(Modeled) 
Mean 
Console 
Price 
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	Zhu and 
Iansiti 
(2007) 
Dynamics of 
Platform 
Competition: 
Exploring the Role 
of Installed Base, 
Platform Quality, 
and Consumer 
Expectation 
Working 
Paper 
Indirect 
Network 
Effects, 
Console 
Quality 
Cumulative 
Unit Sales  
Titles 
Available, 
Avail. of 
Future Titles, 
Gamespot 
Ratings 
Mean 
Console 
Price 
  
Corts and 
Lederman 
(2009) 
Software 
Exclusivity and the 
Scope of Indirect 
Network Effects in 
the US Home 
Video Game 
Market 
International 
Journal of 
Industrial 
Organization 
Number of 
Titles, Market 
Share 
Cumulative 
Unit Sales  
Titles 
Available, 
Number of 
"Hit Games" 
Mean 
Console 
Price 
Title 
exclusivity  
has increased 
over time and 
has weakened 
and changed 
the scope of 
indirect 
network 
effects  
Chintagunt
a, Nair and 
Sukumar 
(2009) 
Measuring 
Marketing Mix 
Effects in the 32/64 
Bit Video Game 
Console Market 
Journal of 
Applied 
Economics 
Units Sold   Titles 
Available 
Mean 
Console 
Price 
  
Dube, 
Hitsch and 
Chintagunt
a (2010) 
Tipping and 
Concentration in 
Markets with 
Indirect Network 
Effects 
Marketing 
Science 
Market Share Customer 
Valuation of 
Variety 
Titles 
Available, 
Avail. of 
Future Titles 
Console 
Price, 
Estimated 
Mfr. 
Royalty 
Fees 
  
Gretz 
(2010) 
Hardware Quality 
vs. Network Size 
in the Home Video 
Game Industry 
Journal of 
Economic 
Behavior & 
Organization 
Market Share 
(Categorical), 
Available 
Titles 
Market Share      Word Length, 
Processor 
Speed, RAM 
16
	Gretz 
(2010) 
Console Price and 
Software 
Availability in the 
Home Video Game 
Industry 
Atlantic 
Economic 
Journal 
Console Price   Titles 
Available 
    
Liu (2010) Dynamics of 
Pricing in the 
Video Game 
Console Market: 
Skimming or 
Penetration? 
Journal of 
Marketing 
Research 
Units Sold, 
Prices 
Unit Sales Titles 
Available 
Mean 
Console 
Price 
Consumer 
Heterogeneity 
(Modeled) 
Srinivasan 
and 
Venkatram
an (2010) 
Indirect Network 
Effects and 
Platform 
Dominance in the 
Video Game 
Industry: A 
Network 
Perspective 
IEEE 
Transactions 
on 
Engineering 
Management 
Market Share Cumulative 
Unit Sales  
Titles 
Available, 
Title Genres 
Available 
Mean 
Console 
Price 
Game Title 
Exclusivity 
Zhou 
(2011) 
Bayesian 
Estimation of a 
Dynamic 
Equilibrium Model 
of Pricing and 
Entry in Two-
Sided Markets: 
Application to 
Video Games 
Working 
Paper 
Console Units 
Sold, Software 
Units Sold, 
Market Entry 
  Online 
Software 
Ratings 
Mean 
Console 
Price, 
Software 
Price 
High- and 
Low-Type 
Consumers 
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	Prieger and 
Hu (2012) 
Applications 
barrier to entry and 
exclusive vertical 
contracts in 
platform markets 
Economic 
Inquiry 
Market Share Market Share  Titles 
Available 
Mean 
Console 
Price 
Game Title 
Exclusivity 
and its impact 
on rivals' 
console 
demand 
Lee (2013) Vertical Integration 
and Exclusivity in 
Platform and Two-
Sided Markets 
The 
American 
Economic 
Review 
Predicted Unit 
Sales, 
Consumer 
Welfare 
  Concentration 
of Sales ("Hit 
Titles " 
measured as 
being a Top 10 
best-selling 
game) 
Mean 
Console 
Price, Mean 
Complemen
t Price 
Prohibiting 
game title 
exclusivity 
contracts 
favors the 
incumbent 
Kim, 
Prince and 
Qiu (2014) 
Indirect network 
effects and the 
quality dimension: 
A look at the 
gaming industry 
International 
Journal of 
Industrial 
Organization 
size of installed 
base 
Unit Sales Quality-
differentiated 
titles 
Price cuts 
(Anecdotal) 
Variety in 
Game Quality  
Derdenger 
(2014) 
Technological 
Tying and the 
Intensity of 
Competition: An 
Empirical Analysis 
of the Video Game 
Industry 
Quantitative 
Marketing 
and 
Economics 
Units Sold Households 
with Units 
Unit Sales and 
Revenue, 
Units per 
Household, 
Genre 
Static 
Prices 
(Modeled) 
Technical 
Features, 
Console as 
Game 
Producer 
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The video game console market is of particular interest in evaluating changing market 
dynamics. Since video game consoles are subject to rapid obsolescence due, in part, to their 
limited extensibility, a series of discrete platform competitions has emerged as new technology 
has been developed and brought to market. Thus each new competition begins with the rise of a 
new technology and ends with the onset of succeeding technologies (Gallagher and Park 2002). 
The resulting competitions have clear beginnings and ends, and each has a limited number of 
participants. Thus, the competitions themselves can be directly compared to each other to enable 
drawing inferences regarding the factors driving differences in competition dynamics.  
2.3 ANALYSIS 
2.3.1 Defining video game platform competitions  
While these successive competitions have proven useful to researchers, the establishment of a 
consistently applied scheme by which to classify the generations of competitions has proven 
problematic. Although Gallagher and Park set out an initial classification scheme in 2002, many 
researchers have opted to draw from only a selected slice of market data, often without respect to 
boundaries around discrete competitions (Gallagher and Park 2002). Still others have invoked 
the concept of generations, without clearly citing the source of those categorizations. This is 
problematic in that understanding potential changes in dynamics among the various competitions 
will be less useful where there is not an agreed-upon set of competitors within any given 
competition. 
Adding to the significant variation in competition classification schemes is the existence 
of a separate classification scheme on the widely-cited website Wikipedia, a scheme that neither 
coincides with classifications used in the academic literature nor presents the criteria used for 
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	determining its own classification. As a result, between Wikipedia’s popular classification and 
those conveyed by the academic literature, researchers and managers are left with a wide, 
inconsistent, and undocumented variety of ways by which the various video game consoles have 
been separated into discrete competitions (see Figure 2).  
For example, the TurboGrafx console introduced in 1989 is characterized as “fourth-
generation” by Wikipedia, but considered as “second generation” (along with earlier consoles, 
such as the 1985 Nintendo NES) in Gretz (Gretz 2010), as “third generation” in Gretz (Gretz 
2010), and omitted entirely by Corts and Lederman (Corts and Lederman 2009).  Similarly, the 
1995 Sony PlayStation is considered as “fifth generation” by both Wikipedia and Corts and 
Lederman, but as “third generation” and “fourth generation” respectively in Gretz (Gretz 2010) 
and Gretz (Gretz 2010), and as “32-/64-bit generation” by both Chintagunta et al. and Dubé et al. 
(Chintagunta et al. 2009; Dubé et al. 2010).  In addition, the Wikipedia classification scheme 
considers video game systems released prior to 1976 as the “first generation”, whereas these 
non-platform devices (i.e., their functionality could not be extended through game cartridges, see 
Footnote 5) are disregarded by academic researchers.  
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Figure 2. Comparison of Video Game Console Competition Classification Schemes 
All of this raises the question as to which scheme is the most appropriate or suitable for 
research. These various existing categorization schemes are also problematic in that they can be 
difficult to replicate in terms of the criteria used to establish the boundaries. For example, the 
earliest of these studies, Gallagher and Park (2002), recounts the historical competitions in the 
video game console industry, identifying along the way six generations, with the onset of each 
new generation defined by the single requirement of a “100% improvement in graphics 
capability” (p. 70). This classification scheme has two limitations. First, there is no specific 
argument proposed as to why improvement in graphics capability is a sufficient and appropriate 
single criterion.  Second, even if graphics capability is assumed to be the best single criterion, the 
measurement used to categorize a new generation is not specified, i.e., the concept of “100% 
improvement” in graphics capability is not defined in a manner that would allow independent 
replication.  
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	A second problem with these competing classifications is that their results, in many 
cases, appear to be in sharp contrast to what has been observed in other network market 
outcomes, further undermining the trust that might otherwise be placed in them.  In particular, 
two such contradictions stand out. The first is that prior theory in the evolution of technology 
markets and the importance of network effects and complementary goods suggest that markets 
such as the home video game console market should be expected to have WTA outcomes in 
which a single dominant standard emerges from amongst a field of competitors (Arthur 1989; 
Katz and Shapiro 1985; Utterback 1996). However, the Wikipedia generational classification, as 
a recent instance of these discordant prior classifications, fails to yield this expected result. For 
example, Wikipedia’s fourth generation does not end with a single competitor having over 50% 
of the market. This anomalous result would have the potential to be of significant interest to 
management of technology scholars and to practice if there could be greater confidence in the 
underlying classification scheme, which is, unfortunately, undocumented.   
Another anomaly from these schemes arises from the considerable research and empirical 
evidence from Christensen and others, which indicates that true generational shifts are the result 
of disruptive technologies, and that a winning vendor in one generation is very rarely the 
winning vendor in the succeeding generation (Christensen 2011; Henderson and Clark 1990). 
For example, as technology progressed over time, the rigid disk drive industry was able to build 
ever-smaller hard disk drives, establishing a number of standards along the way. With the onset 
of each new generation of hard disks (i.e., a new size standard), however, Christensen found that 
the dominant firm in one generation did not come to dominate the succeeding generation (due to 
focusing too acutely on the highly profitable generation in which it dominated).  Similar histories 
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	have been attributed to the computer and PC industry (Christensen 2011) and to the 
photolithography industry (Henderson and Clark 1990). 
The Wikipedia classification scheme contradicts this prior Christensen and related 
research as it includes the Sony PlayStation in its fifth “generation” and the Sony PlayStation 2 
in its sixth, which results in the same competitor winning successive competitions.  Again, like 
the anomalous fourth generation result cited above, this outcome also has the potential to be a 
managerially interesting finding, if it were only based on a reliable, rigorously established, and 
well-documented categorization.   
 
2.3.2 A rationalized classification scheme 
 
The lack of a coherent classification scheme and the anomalous conclusions resulting from the 
Wikipedia generation summary and others suggest the need for an improved classification 
scheme that is unambiguously described and can be consistently applied to past, present, and 
future home video game console competitions.  We propose a scheme that meets these criteria. 
Further, we note that when looking at past competitions, our scheme rectifies the discord 
between existing approaches to classification and theoretical expectations for competitive 
outcomes in past competitions.  
Our scheme is based on both a primary and a secondary classifier. The primary classifier 
is processor word length and, within this, the second classifier is time between world-wide 
release dates. The logic behind this approach is two-fold.  First, processor word length has been a 
widely used technical metric to define computing power (Babb and Terry 2013).  Processors 
with longer word lengths, all else being equal, will have superior operational performance 
relative to shorter word length machines (Corts and Lederman 2009), and these benefits have 
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	resulted in a monotonic growth path for processor word length.  Growth in processor word 
lengths is also a potentially disruptive force in that systems software (e.g., operating systems) 
often requires significant modification in order to take advantage of the new longer word length 
offered by the hardware. Therefore, an incremental increase in processor word lengths is a 
natural technical break point between what we term classes of consoles6. 
Second, we recognize that word length, although a useful metric, may not capture all of 
the technical advancements that take place, particularly in periods where improvements in word 
length happen more slowly. Therefore, we add a second dimension to the classification criteria 
that is based on the time between world-wide release dates. The passage of time as a criterion 
should capture the “residual”, i.e. the incremental technical improvements that naturally occur 
over time and that would not be fully captured by processor word length.  It also has the 
advantage that it is likely to continue to be a useful metric in analyses of future consoles, unlike, 
perhaps, a more locally technology-specific metric, such as a measure of display technology that 
may become outdated.  
Specifically, we consider a new class to begin when a system is introduced with a 
processor with a longer word length (e.g., 64-bit consoles are considered a different class from 
32-bit consoles), and then additionally where there has been a gap of at least two years between 
the world-wide releases of major consoles7.  This second criterion results in splitting each of the 
																																																						
6 We have adopted the terminology of “class” rather than “generation” to convey the notion of 
improvement from one group to the next, and to avoid the confusion with prior work that could 
result from adding one more discordant set of “generations” to the literature. 
7 By “major” we include consoles that sell at least one million units; the million-unit sales figure 
has been a traditional threshold, e.g., Crossley, Rob. 2013, February 19. “Timeline: The 
Towering Triumph of PlayStation 2”, Computer and Video Games. 
http://www.computerandvideogames.com/391986/features/timeline-the-towering-triumph-of-
playstation-2/).  
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	original 8- and 16-bit sets of consoles into multiple classes. The resulting full classification of 
consoles and data regarding sales and class dominance can be found in Figure 3 and Table 28.  
  
 
Figure 3. Authors’ Proposed Classification Scheme 
This new classification scheme results in nine measurable classes of consoles (excluding 
the earliest pre-platform consoles) that cover the entire period from the 1970s to the consoles of 
the most recently completed competition.   
 
2.3.3  Past competitions and WTA outcomes 
 
In contrast with earlier proposals, the classification scheme presented in Figure 3 is consistent, 
clearly explicated, and more easily replicable.  It is also applicable to the entire video game 
console history, rather than being limited to a subset of years like most of the schemes shown in 
Figure 2.  Beyond these desirable measurement characteristics, it also produces a different set of 
dominant consoles (“winners”) than would be yielded by some earlier classification systems. 
																																																						
8 Sales figures given are current world-wide unit sales as of Sep 2016. Sources: Wikipedia 
(Fairchild Channel F, Magnavox Odyssey2); 
http://images.businessweek.com/ss/06/10/game_consoles/source/3.htm (Atari 2600) 
http://www.intellivisiongames.com/history.php (Intellivision) 
http://www.colecovision.dk/history.htm (Colecovision); http://www.mashpedia.com/Atari_5200 
(Atari 5200); http://retro.ign.com/articles/ 965/965032p1.html (Sega Master System) 
http://www.gamasutra.com/blogs/MattMatthews/ 
20090526/1521/Atari_7800_Sales_Figures_1986__1990.php (Atari 7800); 
http://www.gamepro.com/gamepro/ domestic/games/features/111822.shtml (TurboGrafx-16); 
http://segatastic.blogspot.com/2009/12/mega-drive-sales-figures-update.html (Sega Genesis); 
and vgchartz.com (Nintendo NES, Late 16-Bit, 32-Bit, 64-Bit, 128-Bit and Internet Classes). 
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	Two important findings emerge from applying this classification scheme to earlier video 
game console competitions. First, the results of this approach make evident that a single, 
dominant console emerges in each class, as highlighted by bold text in Table 2. This is consistent 
with much prior widely accepted research on technological market evolution, which predicts 
single winners (Katz and Shapiro 1986). Second, this classification scheme yields results in 
which winners do not repeat from one competition to the next, which, again, is predicted by 
existing literature (Christensen 2011; Henderson and Clark 1990; Utterback 1996). Finally, we 
note a significantly different finding for the most recently concluded competition, the Internet 
Class competition, wherein a single winner did not arise. This new result will be explored in 
greater detail in the data analysis section below.  
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	Table 2. Classification of Video Game Console Competition Classes 
 
 
Note: WTA dominant console for each class denoted in bold. 
Class Console 
Word Length or 
Elapsed Time Release Date 
Sales 
(M) 
% of     
Class 
Early 8-Bit Fairchild Channel F 8 Bits Aug-76 0.8 2.2% 
 
Atari 2600 8 Bits Oct-77 30 83.8% 
 
Magnavox Odyssey2 8 Bits 1978 2 5.6% 
 
Mattel Intellivision 10 Bits9 1979 3 8.4% 
Middle 8-Bit Colecovision 8 Bits Aug-82 6  85.7% 
 
Atari 5200 8 Bits Nov-82 1 14.3% 
Late 8-Bit Nintendo NES 8 Bits Oct-85 61.9 78.7% 
 
Sega Master System 8 Bits Jun-86 13 16.5% 
 
Atari 7800 8 Bits Jun-86 3.8 4.8% 
Early 16-Bit NEC TurboGrafx-16 16 Bits Sep-89 10 20.1% 
 
Sega Genesis 16 Bits Sep-89 39.7 79.9% 
Late 16-Bit Nintendo SNES 16 Bits Aug-91 49.1 100.0% 
32-Bit 3D0 32 Bits Oct-93 2 1.7% 
 
Atari Jaguar 32 Bits Nov-93 0.5 0.4% 
 
Sega Saturn 32 Bits May-95 8.8 7.6% 
 
Sony PlayStation 32 Bits Sep-95 104.3 90.2% 
64-Bit Nintendo 64 64 Bits Sep-96 32.9 100.0% 
128-Bit Sega Dreamcast 128 Bits Sep-99 8.2 3.9% 
 
Sony PlayStation 2 128 Bits Oct-00 157.7 74.3% 
 
Nintendo GameCube 128 Bits Nov-01 21.7 10.2% 
 
Microsoft Xbox 128 Bits Nov-01 24.7 11.6% 
Internet Class Microsoft Xbox 360    4 years10 Nov-05 85. 6 31.3% 
 
Sony PlayStation 3 6 years Nov-06 86.6 31.7% 
 
Nintendo Wii 5 years Nov-06 101.2 37.0% 
 
 
2.3.4 The transition to WTS 
 
We term the most recently completed competition the “Internet Class” competition. It began with 
the release of the Microsoft Xbox 360 in November 2005. Its competitors, the Nintendo Wii and 
Sony PlayStation 3, were both released worldwide in November 2006.  Industry expectations 
were that this competition would end with a single winner as had previous competitions, with 
																																																						
9 This oddity has been confirmed at the manufacturer’s website: 
http://www.intellivisionworld.com/English/FAQ/.   Including this unique console configuration 
with its contemporary peers in the Early 8-bit Class, despite the disparity in word length, does 
not materially affect the results, given its low sales.   
10 This class is designated through Rule 2 (i.e., the number of years between major releases).	
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	many industry pundits predicting an eventual victory for one or another of the platforms. For 
example, in 2007, the research firm Research and Markets predicted that the PlayStation 3 would 
be the eventual winner (Berardini 2007), whereas Wired magazine projected a victory for 
Nintendo’s Wii (Beschizza 2007).  In 2008 Don Reisinger at CNet claimed that Microsoft’s 
Xbox 360 would win (Reisinger 2008)11. 
Based on their chosen strategies the manufacturers of these consoles also appeared to 
believe that the Internet Class competition would yield a WTA result.  Microsoft, for instance, 
hoped to gain an edge by being the first to release their platform, blaming their failure to 
dominate the previous, 128-bit class in part on conceding a full year of sales to the eventual 
winner, PlayStation 2 (Morris 2005).  In the third year of the competition, Microsoft seemed to 
continue to believe that a WTA result would occur, pointing out in a press release that it had 
been the first to reach 10 million unit sales in the United States and that, according to one senior 
vice president, “History has shown us that the first company to reach 10 million in console sales 
wins the generation battle” (Mcwhertor 2008).  However, despite this head-start, and an early 
lead in sales, by the end of 2007 (the first full year in which all three consoles were available) the 
Xbox 360 had lost its lead in worldwide sales (Babb and Terry 2013) (see Figure 4).  
In fact, at the end of 2008 it looked as though the Internet Class competition might 
instead tip toward Nintendo, as at that point the Wii installed base share had grown to 48.6%.  
This trajectory, together with the expectation of strong network effects as had been witnessed in 
past competitions, bolstered the idea that the Wii would become the competition’s dominant 
platform.  
 
																																																						
11 Note that industry observers predicted a WTA outcome, although was no general agreement 
on which console would win.   
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Figure 4. Percentage of Worldwide Installed Base by Platform by Year, Internet Class 
 
That dominance, however, never occurred. Despite its lead in installed base, Wii’s market 
share fell every year after 2008.  In 2011, more units of each of the PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360 
were sold than of the Wii.  By the end of 2012, while Nintendo’s console retained a larger 
installed base than its two competitors, none of the three could claim 50% of the market (see 
Figure 4).   Given that this competition is now over, we note that, unlike those that preceded it, it 
did not result in a WTA outcome but rather a three-way WTS outcome.  In the next section, we 
discuss this anomalous result and evaluate multi-homing’s contribution to this outcome.   
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	2.3.5 Influence of multi-homing 
 
2.3.5.1 Multi-homing measurement  
 
Given the findings of recent work within the mobile phone app context (Bresnahan et al. 2015), 
where multi-homing behavior of the most popular apps was seen to influence competition 
outcomes, we now examine whether multi-homing behavior by complementary products 
contributed to the historically anomalous WTS outcome seen in the most recently concluded 
competition.  
In particular, Bresnahan argues that it is the multi-homing decisions of those 
complements deemed most valuable to the user12 that are instrumental in determining a platform 
competition’s result. Their model allows for the heterogeneity of the value to the user among 
complements, and assumes that the higher value apps make a larger contribution to the 
attractiveness of the platform to the user, all else being equal. The decision by such high value 
complements to multi-home can sustain a WTS market outcome. Given that video game platform 
complements are primarily video game content, we focus on the video games that can be seen as 
the high value complements. In the video game industry game critique websites, such as 
IGN.com, GameSpot.com, GameCritics.com, and GameRankings.com publish reviews, rankings 
and scores for games, giving a measure of the value for the investment the users will make when 
buying a game (Stuart 2015). These professional video game critics are found to have a greater 
influence on buyers’ decisions than other consumers’ opinions, and higher review scores are 
found to lead to higher sales (Cox and Kaimann 2015).  Therefore, consistent with this prior 
work, we believe that it is appropriate to treat these ratings as a useful measure of user value.  
																																																						
12 Bresnahan et al. use popularity, attractiveness and value to the user somewhat 
interchangeably.  To avoid confusion with other specific popularity measures in use we will 
generally refer to this concept as “value to the user”.   
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	Given our ultimate research focus on the relative success of console platforms, we need 
to specify what qualifies as multi-homing for the purpose of our analysis. Each game may have 
been released on only one platform (i.e. single-homing) or on more than one platform 
(potentially multi-homing). Within the context of this analysis, we consider a multi-homing game 
one that was released on multiple platforms in the same class. Our definition of  multi-homing is 
therefore more specific than  prior videogame research where an exclusive game has been 
defined as one that has never been released on any other platform, regardless of class (Corts and 
Lederman 2009). Under our definition if a game is released on only one platform in a given class 
competition then it is single-homing within that competition, regardless of whether it is also 
released for a platform (or platforms) engaged in a different class competition. Again, we take 
this measure since we are concerned only with the outcomes of discrete competitions defined by 
classes; therefore, the fact that a game may also later be released on a platform in a future class 
cannot affect the outcome of the current class in question. In order to restrict the analysis of 
multi-homing to a given competitive class we exclude the games that are released after the 
competition in a given class is settled.  We use a consistent cutoff date of December 31st of the 
year in which the first video game console of the next class is in the market.  This is to ensure 
that a multi-homing game is, in fact, influencing the market outcome before the competition of 
the current class ends. 
In addition, our study, following Bresnahan et al., also differentiates between multi-
homing (at the time of a complementary good’s introduction) and late multi-homing (Bresnahan 
et al. 2015).  Late multi-homing is described as an instance where a complement is ported to a 
second platform, but, due to the delay in availability on multiple platforms, it can no longer be 
influential on whether the market tips (Bresnahan et al. 2015).  Given the relatively short cycle 
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	times for each class in the video game context, we consider it an instance of late multi-homing 
when it takes more than six months for a complement to become available on a second platform.  
In analyzing the impact of multi-homing on platform success it is appropriate to restrict the 
analysis of multi-homing to a given competitive class13.  
Previous video game studies which looked at software exclusivity considered them 
retrospectively and cross-sectionally, such that if a given piece of software (e.g., video game, 
mobile app, etc.) had ever been available on more than one platform, it is considered multi-
homing (Corts and Lederman 2009; Lee 2013).  However, in the economics multi-homing 
literature there are documented instances where a delay in multi-homing has made it 
uninfluential on the market outcome (Bresnahan et al. 2015) (Farrell and Klemperer 2007).  
Therefore, we specify that for a multi-homing game to be relevant the gap between release dates 
on the first platform and the second platform must be less than six months14. This differentiation 
is important in the context of video game consoles due to the generational pattern of this market.  
If a game is ported to a second console long after the dynamics of competition in that class have 
taken shape, such a delay means that multi-homing cannot influence the market outcome.    
 
 
 
 
																																																						
13 We also conducted a sensitivity analysis using a longer lag time, and the main results were 
unchanged.    
14 This is unless the second platform has entered the market more than six months after the 
release of the game. In that case, the gap between the release date of the game on the second 
platform and the market entry of the second platform needs to be less than six months.  It should 
be noted that sensitivity analysis was also done using an alternative one year gap size, and those 
results are consistent with the six month gap. 
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	2.3.5.2 Multi-homing behavior of the top MobyRank games  
 
MobyGames15 is a comprehensive source for video game data that has been used previously in 
academic studies (e.g., Corts & Lederman 2009). Its content includes video game ratings offered 
from professional critics and other respected reviewers whose work appears in various media 
outlets (e.g., online, television, print) (“MobyGames FAQ” 2014).  Based on its assembly of 
third-party reviews, MobyGames assigns each game a “MobyRank”, which is a measure of 
collective critical opinion and critical success. This rank is based on a weighted average of 
normalized rankings from the various reviews collected, and requires the availability of a 
minimum number of critical ratings. In prior research meta critic scores similar to MobyRank are 
found to be a determinant of sales performance, e.g. high scores were found to be a determinant 
of a game becoming a blockbuster, and a proxy for the utility derived by the player (Cox 2014). 
We therefore use MobyRank as a measure for video game user value. 
Review Source Review Date Rating 
Normalized 
Rating 
Game Over Online Nov 22, 2010 80 out of 100 80 
Hey Poor Player Dec 08, 2010  80 
Gamers Daily News Nov 24, 2010 7.5 out of 10 75 
GamePro (US) Nov 19, 2010 
 
70 
Softpedia Dec 20, 2010 7 out of 10 70 
Gamereactor (Sweden) Nov 22, 2010 7 out of 10 70 
IGN Nov 19, 2010 6 out of 10 60 
videogamer.com Nov 26, 2010 6 out of 10 60 
Eurogamer.net (UK) Nov 26, 2010 3 out of 10 30 
1UP Nov 26, 2010 D 25 
Figure 5. Critic Reviews for a Sample Game on MobyGames (Source: MobyGames.com16) 
 
																																																						
15 http://www.mobygames.com/	
16 http://www.mobygames.com/game/xbox360/crazy-taxi 
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	Figure 5 depicts a sample of critic reviews for a game with multiple sources of critics. 
MobyGames also presents a list of the “most popular” games for each platform.  We use the 
MobyRank measure of games within this most popular set to identify the highly valued games. 
Appendix A provides a detailed list of the games considered.  We collected data on the highest 
MobyRanked games for each platform in the following classes: Early 16-bit class, 32-bit class, 
128-bit Class, Internet Class (See Table 3).17 We collected the game title and MobyRank for 
these most popular games for each console. 
																																																						
17 We do not include Late 16-bit class and 64-bit class in this analysis as there is only one 
platform in each of these classes and therefore it would not be possible to examine multi-homing 
across platforms. In addition, in the Internet Class, we exclude Wii since compared to PS3 and 
Xbox 360, Wii is lacking in technical and graphical capabilities (Bakalar 2009). Given the 
introduction of the Wii remote, Wii differs from Xbox 360 and PlayStation 3 in the audience it 
attracts and its most popular genres (Marchand and Hennig-Thurau 2013). Wii does not support 
HD and its hardware is not on a par with either the PS3 or Xbox360. Xbox 360 and PS3 both 
have CPUs working at 3.2 GHz, while the microprocessor of a Wii console operates at 729 MHz.  
The Wii has significantly less main system RAM (64 MB compared to Xbox 360's 512 MB 
shared RAM and PS3's 256 GB). PS3 and Xbox360 are also superior and faster to Wii when it 
comes to GPU: the GPU clock speed for Xbox 360, PS3 and Wii are 500 MHz, 550 MHz and 
243 MHz respectively. Xbox 360 has 512 MB of shared video RAM and PS3 benefits from 256 
MB of video RAM, while the Wii uses 24 MB of video RAM (Thurrott 2010). These technical 
differences make it essentially technically infeasible and therefore very unlikely for PS3 and 
Xbox 360 games to be available on Wii, and vice versa. For the same reason, other studies have 
also excluded Wii when analyzing the competition in this class (Rietveld et al. 2016). 
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Table 3. Video Game Consoles and Classes Included in the Most Popular Games Dataset 
Class Video Console # of games with release dates 
Early 16-bit class  
TurboGrafx 151 
Sega Genesis 158 
32-bit class  
3DO 113 
Atari Jaguar 59 
Sega Saturn 144 
Sony PlayStation 183 
128-bit Class 
Sega Dreamcast 171 
Sony PS2 202 
Nintendo GameCube 193 
Microsoft Xbox 189 
Internet Class  
Microsoft Xbox 360 169 
Sony PlayStation 3 137 
 
 
Next, we rely on Gamewise for data on the release dates for the popular games. 
Gamewise contains data on more than 45,000 games and offers a searchable database18. 
Gamewise contains release data of videogames on the different platforms for which each game 
has been released.  From this source we were able to collect release dates for 80% of 
MobyGames-rated most popular games19 (Table 3).  In the event that a game on a platform is 
released on different dates in different regions, we collect the first release date on that platform.  
The collected data set from these two sources contains, for each game, the platform(s) for which 
the game was released, the release date on each platform, and its MobyRank. 
																																																						
18 See http://gamewise.co/ and http://gamewise.co/about/ 
19 Twenty percent of the games do not appear in the Gamewise.co database of the games, or the 
database lacks complete data on their release dates. However, these games are less likely to 
appear in the top-ten or top-20 games, and therefore their omission is unlikely to affect the 
results. 
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	Using these data we present the results for the top-ten popular games with the highest 
MobyRank for each platform in each class20. For example, in the Early 16-bit class we find the 
ten games with the highest MobyRank on TurboGrafx and on Sega Genesis. We label each of 
these games as either multi-homing or single-homing.  The results (Table 4) show that only ten 
percent of these twenty games (top-ten on two platforms) are multi-homing (i.e. only two highly 
ranked games in the Early 16-bit class are available on multiple platforms). 
 
Table 4. Level of Multi-homing among top-ten highly MobyRanked games 
Class % of multi-homing games 
Early 16-bit class  10% 
32-bit class 20% 
128-bit Class  43% 
Internet Class  65% 
 
Table 4 shows that the percentage of games that are multi-homing increases from this 
mere 10% level to 65% in the Internet Class competition, or more than half of the games. In prior 
studies regarding dominant design emergence, a dominant design has been defined as when 50% 
or more of products all share the design (Benner and Tripsas 2012).  Analogously, we propose 
that when the level of multi-homing among the most highly valued complements exceeds the 
50% threshold, that this leads to a WTS platform market.   
 
 
 
																																																						
20 Note that the result shown also holds if a different threshold is used, e.g. top-20 games, rather 
than the traditional top-10 (Lee 2013).  	
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	2.3.5.3 Multi-homing behavior of the top GameRankings games  
To increase our confidence in the results and allow us to focus further on the change in multi-
homing between the 128-bit and Internet Classes, we next collect an alternative set of ranking 
data from a different source, GameRankings.  Similar to MobyGames, GameRankings aggregates 
review scores for games from both online and offline sources21. Using these sources they 
compile lists of all-time top-ten best games for each platform in the 128-bit and the Internet 
Classes22.  We follow the same procedure to identify the multi-homing games in each class and 
observe the change in the levels of multi-homing between two classes (Table 5).  
 
Table 5. Level of Multi-homing among all-time best games 
Class % of multi-homing games  
128-bit Class  33% 
Internet Class  50% 
 
We see here a result similar to that offered using the MobyGames data, thus confirming 
an increase in multi-homing from the 128-bit to the Internet Class among the highest rated games 
available in each of those classes. This corroborates the idea that a shift in multi-homing 
behavior among the highest valued complements has helped drive the WTS result in this most 
recently completed competition. 
 
 
 
																																																						
21 See http://www.gamerankings.com/ and http://www.gamerankings.com/help.html 
22 Historical data on GameRankings is not available for all platforms in the early 16-bit and the 
32-bit classes 
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	2.3.5.4 Multi-homing behavior of the top VGChartz-selling games  
 
Additionally, we also consider actual complement sales as a proxy for user value, a measure that 
determines which complementary goods’ multi-homing decisions might influence a 
competition’s outcome.  Data were collected on the top-ten best-selling games for all consoles in 
the 128-bit and Internet Classes from VGChartz.com, an industry research firm that publishes 
data and estimates related to game hardware and software sales23.  Using release date data from 
Gamewise, and using our same multi-homing criteria, we identify multi-homing games and 
measure the percentage of multi-homing among the top-ten best-selling games in each class 
(Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Level of Multi-homing among top-ten best-selling games 
Class % of multi-homing games  
128-bit Class  18% 
Internet Class  60% 
 
We observe here an even greater increase in the levels of multi-homing between the 128-
bit and the Internet Classes when complement value, as measured by sales, is considered.  These 
results show that 60% of the top-ten best-selling games for the platforms in the Internet Class are 
multi-homing, as opposed to only 18% of such games multi-homing in the prior 128-bit class. 
  
																																																						
23 http://www.vgchartz.com/about.php.  Historical data for classes earlier than these two were not 
available on this site.  A sensitivity analysis shows that these results also hold true for alternative 
thresholds, e.g. top-20 games.   
38
	2.3.5.5 Additional sensitivity analyses   
In identifying the most highly valued games we followed the prior literature that has relied on a 
top-ten list (Lee 2013). Here, we test the robustness of our results using an alternative criterion, 
i.e. the top-20 games.  Table 7 shows the result of analyzing the data on the top-20 most popular 
games with the highest MobyRank and the top-20 best-selling games per VGChartz. The pattern 
of change in the levels of multi-homing is consistent with the previous results on the top-ten 
games24.  
 
Table 7. Level of Multi-homing among Top-20 MobyRanked and VGChartz Games 
 
Class Top-20 MobyRanked 
Games 
Top-20 VGChartz 
Games 
Early 16-bit Class  7% N/A 
32-bit Class 15% N/A 
128-bit Class  51% 23% 
Internet Class  62% 55% 
 
As a second sensitivity analysis, and to further explore the observed increase in multi-
homing in the Internet Class, we performed an analysis using an alternative gap size of one year 
between the release dates to tag a game as multi-homing (as opposed to the six-month gap used 
to differentiate late multi-homing in the previous analyses). Applying this new specification 
across all three data sources yielded the results shown in Table 8 for the ten games with (a) the 
highest MobyGames ranking, (b) the highest GameRankings rankings, and (c) the best-selling 
games per VGChartz.com. 
																																																						
24 Similar sensitivity analysis is not possible using the GameRankings data since GameRankings 
compiles lists of all-time top-ten best games only.   
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	Even with this more generous definition of concurrent multi-homing the observed 
patterns of change remain consistent with previous results and show a meaningful increase in the 
level of multi-homing in the Internet Class compared to previous video game console classes.   
 
Table 8. Level of Multi-homing among top-ten games with one year gap size, across game-ranking sites 
Class 
Top-ten 
MobyRanked 
Games 
Top-ten 
GameRanking 
Games 
Top-ten 
VGChartz 
Games 
Early 16-bit Class  10%  N/A  N/A 
32-bit Class  25%  N/A  N/A 
128-bit Class 48% 43% 20% 
Internet Class  65% 55% 60% 
 
Third, we test for the sensitivity of our results using an alternative, stricter measure of 
multi-homing. This alternative measure adds a stricter criterion for labeling a game as multi-
homing by examining the specific platforms the game is available on. In this analysis, a game is 
labeled as multi-homing if it meets the previously described criteria and is also released on the 
dominant video game console of that class. For example, the game “Flashback: The Quest for 
Identity” released on the Atari Jaguar in the 32-bit class is also available on the 3DO console, but 
not on the Sony PlayStation, which was the market winner of this class. Therefore, under this 
alternative stricter measure it would not be considered multi-homing.  The results of the analysis 
using the stricter measure are shown in Table 9. We observe that, consistent with prior results, 
the level of multi-homing has been steadily increasing over time. 
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	Table 9. Level of Multi-homing among top-ten MobyRanked games  
using stricter measure of multi-homing 
Class % of multi-homing games  
Early 16-bit class  10% 
32-bit class 13% 
128-bit class  38% 
Internet class  N/A25 
 
In another sensitivity analysis, we consider the possibility that for the games released in 
the holiday season, the multi-homing decision may have a stronger influence on competition 
outcome. This is because the games released in the holiday season receive more attention and 
demand from the users, and some users may decide to purchase a video game console only due 
to the exclusivity of the hottest game released in the season. To account for this effect, we use a 
smaller gap size of three months for the games released in the month of November. The result for 
the games among top-ten highly MobyRanked games is presented in tables 10. The results 
remain either unchanged or consistent with the main results.  
Table 10.	Level of Multi-homing among top-ten MobyRanked games  
using a smaller gap size for holiday season games 
Class % of multi-homing games 
Early 16-bit class  10% 
32-bit class 15% 
128-bit Class  43% 
Internet Class  60% 
 
Additionally, we turn our attention to the release time of the games, to evaluate how far 
along in the competition the games are released. The premise here is that the games that are 
released towards the end of a cycle of competition may be less influential in the WTS outcome. 
To this end, we perform the analysis, using the six-months gap size, for the games released 
																																																						
25  The level of multi-homing using the alternative measure based on a dominant platform cannot 
be computed for the Internet Class because there is no single winner in this class. 
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	before the competition has reached its mid-point. Also, we perform the analysis by only 
including the games that are released before two-thirds of the time of the competition between 
platforms has passed. The results are presented in tables 11 and 12.  The results remain 
consistent with the main findings, showing that the level of multi-homing has been steadily 
increasing over time. 
Table 11.	Level of Multi-homing among top-ten MobyRanked games  
for the games released before mid-point of competition	
Class % of multi-homing games 
Early 16-bit class  5% 
32-bit class 20% 
128-bit Class  43% 
Internet Class  60% 
 
Table 12.	Level of Multi-homing among top-ten MobyRanked games  
for the games released before two-third-point of competition	
Class % of multi-homing games 
Early 16-bit class  15% 
32-bit class 23% 
128-bit Class  48% 
Internet Class  65% 
 
All of these sensitivity analyses support the initial results of an increasing level of multi-
homing of video games over time.  In the next section, we discuss the implications of this 
observed change and how it supports a WTS outcome for the Internet Class video game market. 
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	2.4 DISCUSSION 
2.4.1 Summary of results 
 
The emergence of a dominant leader with a substantial majority of the market share has typically 
been the observed outcome in platform markets.  But, in more recent competitions, there have 
been occurrences of an alternative outcome in which there are multiple winners, each with some 
relevant market portion (Liu et al. 2012).  Understanding the underlying mechanism that results 
in such a change in the dynamics of market should be useful to managers as it helps to guide 
appropriate strategies for firms to better position their products and services.  To better compare 
the classes of video game consoles and to address the conflicts between different classifications 
of consoles, we proposed a new, objective classification scheme to define the discrete platform 
competitions. The scheme is based on two classifiers: processor word length and time between 
world-wide release dates. Using the new, objective scheme enabled us to appropriately determine 
the results of the competitions in each class, which shows an unprecedented, “no-tipping” WTS 
outcome in the Internet Class.  
Prior literature has emphasized the importance of multi-homing, especially among highly 
valued complementors, and how multi-homing can influence whether or not a market tips toward 
any one platform. We collected and analyzed three sets of data to examine whether developers of 
the most highly valued video games in the Internet Class are releasing their games on multiple 
platforms at a higher rate than they did in previous classes.  We started by analyzing the data on 
highest MobyRanked games for each console in four consecutive classes and found that multi-
homing rose from 10% to 65% from the Early 16-bit Class to the Internet Class.  Using an 
alternative data source, we performed a similar analysis to compare multi-homing behavior 
among the highest rated games of both the 128-bit and Internet Classes, which confirmed our 
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	original finding.  We also considered game sales as a measure and again witnessed the same 
outcome, where the games with the highest sales multi-homed substantially more in the Internet 
Class competition than the 128-bit class, up to 60% of the top-ten most popular games (from 
18%). We also confirmed the robustness of our results by testing with different samples (e.g. top-
20 rather than top-10) and varying the gap size (from 6 months to one year). 
 
2.4.2 Implications 
 
The increase in the level of multi-homing among the highest quality and most popular games is 
associated with the emergence of an unprecedented WTS outcome in the Internet Class of video 
game consoles.  Reports from industry show the prevalence of multi-homing among the most 
popular games in the Internet Class even in 2013, which was the last year the Internet Class 
consoles competed against each other.  According to a report from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) 
at the end of the Internet Class in 2013, the three games that revitalized the video game industry 
before the release of the next-class consoles were “Grand Theft Auto V”, ”Madden NFL 2015” 
and “NBA 2K14” (Sherr 2013).  Looking at the data available on these games it is interesting 
(but now not surprising) to see that all of these games are multi-homing in the Internet Class, 
consistent with the results of our study. 
While the presence of a single dominant platform has the potential to benefit all members 
of a market, it is also the case that complement providers (e.g., video game developers) have a 
counter-incentive to actively promote the survival of multiple platforms.  Intuitively, in a market 
with a monopolistic platform, that platform has considerable leverage in negotiating the licensing 
fees it receives from game sales, while with multiple platforms this is diminished, all else being 
equal.  When there are multiple viable, successful-enough platforms, game developers have a 
44
	stronger negotiating position and may opt to develop for all, a subset, or only one of the 
competitors. In earlier competitions, this preference may have been offset by significant costs; 
developing for multiple platforms means re-programming games to work on those platforms as 
well as, in the pre-digital downloads days, incurring costs to manufacture and warehouse 
products.  However, technology and practices have changed such that more of the initial costs 
incurred when writing a game for its first platform are now avoidable in making the game 
available on a second platform.  The WSJ reported that new software tools have reduced the 
amount of repetitive work needed to make games, and this new layer of automation saves both 
time and money for game developers (Sherr 2013). For instance, in the past decade game 
publisher Electronic Arts has been devoted to enhancing the game engines that are described as 
“dynamic workhorses”. The game engines provide tools to game developers, making game 
development more efficient and enabling more cost-effective cross platform development 
(Needleman 2016)26. In addition, past versions of Xbox and PlayStation consoles used very 
different hardware chips, which increased development time to create two sets of software. 
However, in the Internet Class, they used the same chip.  
Additionally, given the incentives to do so, including reduced porting costs, much of the 
economic rent in the videogame industry may have shifted from the platform owners to the game 
developers (Dao and Zmud 2015).  Sales of “blockbuster” games suggest that game makers are 
indeed reaping the benefits of this shift27. Further evidence was admitted by Nintendo president 
																																																						
26 Similar to the middleware engines used in video game development, cross-platform 
development tools for smartphone applications can also reduce the required effort for application 
development. These tools allow for creating apps for different operating systems using the same 
base code (Ohrt and Turau 2012) 
27 “In Video Game Market, Blockbusters’ Dominance Grows”, New York Times BITS, 
September 30, 2013	
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	Satoru Iwata, who said that widening games’ availability threatened the existence of Nintendo, 
which has relied on its exclusive access to its games to sell its consoles (Negishi 2013).   
In the Internet Class, competition reduction in the cost of game development may have 
also been a function of downloadable content, which provides revenue opportunities to help 
offset multi-homing costs. The in-game purchases of downloadable content are a source of 
revenue for both downloadable games and games purchased in physical format. This enables the 
game developers to realize further income from the same general game and code base, thus 
helping to offset multi-homing costs in the Internet Class. Further, information regarding the 
downloadable content is easily obtained via the Internet and it facilitates a consumer’s decision-
making on purchasing such content (Lim et al. 2012).The transition to making games Internet-
compatible and the consoles Internet-ready started with consoles in the 128-bit class, although 
these were limited in the age of relatively slow dial-up modems (Collins 2000). In fact, the 
chance of success for the Internet connectivity feature was questioned by contemporaneous 
observers partly because the fulfillment of transactions required a high-speed broadband 
infrastructure that could support widespread Internet access and high-volume information 
transmission, which took time to develop (Takahashi 2000).  Therefore, despite the fact that 
consoles like the PlayStation 2 were capable of connecting to the Internet, it was speculated that 
Sony had to wait until its next class of consoles (i.e., PlayStation 3) before its online ambitions 
could be realized (Dawson 2000). However, with advances in networking technology and the 
widespread availability of faster Internet services, Internet-enablement became standard for 
consoles in the Internet Class, and games and game content can be downloaded onto consoles 
without the use of physical media. Both PlayStation 3 and Xbox 360 included far more extensive 
connections with the Internet than their predecessors (Guth et al. 2005).  
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	Sony and Microsoft are also changing their focus to achieve increases in service revenues 
such as subscription and downloadable games (Needleman and Mochizuki 2016).  This follows 
the change in consumers’ habits to increasingly buy and download video games over the Internet 
(Sherr 2014).  Electronic Arts, for example, announced in 2014 that sales and game downloads 
over the Internet made up 45% of the company’s revenue, and this was expected to reach 50% in 
2015 (Sherr 2014).  Earlier in 2013 the president of Nintendo also stated that Nintendo was 
under pressure to change its console-focused business strategy due to the prevalence of 
downloadable games that can move seamlessly between platforms (Negishi 2013).  
In addition to the increased availability of downloadable games, the video game console 
market has witnessed a surge in the supply of free-to-play games. Free games offered on 
websites have been a source of revenue since the 1990s, when advertisers incorporated products 
directly into games (Barnes 2002).  In the video game console market the free-to-play games are 
available without an initial purchase, but the in-game purchases make these games a source of 
revenue.  The increase in market revenue of the free-to-play games that are offered in 
downloadable form started in the Internet Class, and it has been on the rise since 2010. The 
expansion of downloadable games and the proliferation of free-to-play games allow game 
developers to benefit from the same code base on multiple platforms and from gaining revenue 
from in-app purchases (Negishi 2013). These additional revenue opportunities make multi-
homing more feasible for game developers. 
A change in the generational nature of the video game console market may also be 
reflecting the observed change in dynamics of the market and the high potential for emergence of 
a WTS outcome.  Recently the WSJ reported that, instead of introducing a new generation of 
consoles after several years, Sony and Microsoft will be releasing modest hardware upgrades 
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	more frequently (Needleman and Mochizuki 2016).  Sony released a hardware-upgraded 
successor to the PlayStation 4 in November 2016; this successor is still branded as a PlayStation 
4 and is compatible with the earlier version. The WSJ further reported that Microsoft is expected 
to follow suit in late 2017.  Neither of these two new releases is considered a next-generation 
console, but rather consoles that are compatible with the PS4 and the Xbox One, but with faster 
Graphic Processing Units (GPUs) (Baker 2016).  This is in contrast to the industry-wide pattern 
for console makers to release their next console about every five years (“No Laughing Matter” 
2001). Since there does not seem to be a large technological leap from the current class of 
consoles to their successors, this sort of backward compatibility can help console makers to take 
advantage of their already existing installed base (Claussen et al. 2010). Given the prevalence of 
multi-homing among the most popular games, the backward compatibility can intensify the 
impact of such games on the market outcome. 
 
2.4.3 Conclusions and future research 
 
In this research, we have reexamined the platform market for videogame consoles and their 
complementary videogames.  Using a new objective measurement scheme we identify a series of 
classes of videogame platforms, for which all but the last exhibit classic Winner-Takes-All 
(WTA) outcomes and all exhibit the Christensen-like propensity for incumbents in one class to 
be replaced by a new entrant in the succeeding class.  In the last completed class, the Internet 
Class, a Winners-Take-Some (WTS) outcome has been observed, and, as suggested by recent 
economics research, this is also the class where a high level of multi-homing of its complements 
was observed.  Contemporaneous news accounts point to declining multi-homing costs in this 
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	environment related to software engines and downloadable media, and these can reasonably be 
assumed to have contributed to the multi-homing outcome.   
 While the differences between the Internet Class video game console competition and 
earlier competitions are clear, they lead to the more broadly interesting question of whether these 
differences represent a more general shift in digital goods markets.  Prior research in flash 
memory, graphics formats, and apps for mobile operating systems have shown that all of these 
are also demonstrating a tendency towards WTS equilibria.  Future empirical research could be 
usefully devoted to other platform markets that may exhibit similar changes, such as application 
software in non-mobile operating system environments and streamed or otherwise downloadable 
digital consumer media that have supplanted fixed physical format complements.  Similar 
changes in these environments would suggest that managers re-consider market strategies that 
have been honed based on the WTA outcomes of past market competitions.   
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3.0 USER ENGAGEMENT IN DIGITAL PLATFORMS: 
 A FIELD EXPERIMENT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
	
A digital platform, powered by the Internet and connected users, is a networked ecosystem that 
facilitates the interaction between multiple market participants cohabiting the ecosystem 
(Choudary et al. 2013). By orchestrating the supply and demand, digital platforms facilitate the 
exchange of physical goods (e.g., Amazon, e-bay), services (Uber, Airbnb), or information goods 
(Netflix, Spotify). 
The performance and the success of platform companies are often measured through 
metrics such as the number of users, the volume of facilitated transactions, and the revenue 
generated (Enders et al. 2008). Platforms can follow different strategies to gain revenue such as 
imposing transaction fees on exchange of physical goods or services, charging subscription fees 
to grant access to the platform and/or the content, and sale of advertising. It is expected that with 
the success in acquiring and retaining participants on both the demand and supply sides of the 
platform, increasing users’ willingness to pay, and enabling more successful interactions, more 
revenue is generated (Enders et al. 2008; Gallaugher et al. 2001). Additionally, since the 
platforms create value by enabling the interactions between the demand and supply side 
participants, their success relies on not only acquiring users, but to encourage and facilitate their 
engagement with the platform. Besides, with higher levels of use and engagement, users’ 
valuation of and loyalty to the platform increases, which creates a barrier to switching to 
alternative platforms. Therefore, another important measure of success is the amount of 
engagement platforms can solicit from their participants (Slaney 2011). When users are willing 
to invest in a platform by giving it their attention, they are bound to spend more time on and 
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engage more with the platform. The users’ participation and engagement with the platform can 
therefore be a key driver of success. 
Paying attention to user engagement is even more important for platforms that enable the 
exchange of information goods (e.g. movies, music, news) as compared to those enabling 
exchange of physical goods or services. Platforms enabling the exchange of physical goods (e.g., 
e-bay, Amazon) strive for brokering more transactions, having sellers sell more and getting users 
to make more purchases. On platforms that provide a service (e.g., Uber, Airbnb), the goal is to 
get users to request a service more frequently. In contrast, the platforms that enable the exchange 
of information goods push for increasing the viewership and the engagement on the platform 
(Verhage 2016). Similar to many digital content providers, Buzzfeed, a social news website, 
considers the number of unique visitors or page views as an outdated success metric. Instead, the 
company considers metrics that can measure engagement as more important (Ingram 2016). For 
example, content providers track “attention-minute,” which measures the “engaged-time” of 
users (Ingram 2014). Digital content provider platforms follow numerous strategies to encourage 
and increase user engagement. Adding new features, for example, worked very well for 
Instagram (the mobile photo-sharing application with nearly 700 million active users). 
Introducing Instagram Stories –pictures and videos that disappear after 24 hours- as a new 
feature greatly increased the engagement-to-follower rate on the photo-sharing platform, as users 
were provided with a new way of interacting with each other (Constine 2017).  
Since information goods are often experience goods, the information about the product is 
better obtained through experiencing it rather than searching for information. For such products, 
a consumer’s behavior greatly relies on guided sampling based on recommendations (Nelson 
1970). Platforms that provide information goods can therefore facilitate guided sampling and 
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provide recommendations to get users to consume more and to spend more time on the platform. 
Platforms rely on implementing recommendation systems to enable content discovery and 
increase user engagement. YouTube, the world’s most popular online video community, relies 
heavily on personalized recommendations to facilitate content discovery and keep users 
entertained and engaged (Arora 2016; Davidson et al. 2010). Likewise, some platforms rely on 
including social features in the design to increase engagement. Spotify, a leading music 
streaming platform, allows its users to follow artists and other users on the platform learn what 
they are listening to (Katz 2012). Moreover, platforms attempt at providing appropriate 
information signals (in the form of reviews, ratings, etc.) that can lead to higher content user 
engagement and discovery. Recently, Netflix transformed its ranking system from the five-star 
ratings to a simple thumbs up and thumbs down, aiming at simplifying and increasing the rating 
activity of its users. The input from users is then used to develop and present users with a 
“percentage match” informational signal, that can help them discover contents that match their 
taste (Molina 2017).  
Despite the practical relevance of monitoring user's engagement for platforms, a rigorous 
examination of the factors that influence user engagement in the research literature is still scarce. 
Extant studies have mostly focused on ways to increase number of adopting users (Bapna and 
Umyarov 2015), users’ willingness to pay (Dou et al. 2013) , amount of content consumption 
(Sanjeev Dewan et al. 2017),  and firms’ revenue and profit (Jiang and Guo 2015). The 
exceptions are some recent works, which study the effectiveness of design and information 
signals on users’ engagement, search experience and discovery (Amblee et al. 2017; Yi et al. 
2017). Yi et al examine how the design of social commerce platforms can influence users’ search 
experience and decision satisfaction. By offering two types of social product search cues 
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(product tags and socially endorsed people), this study focuses on how the search experience can 
be improved in terms of the diagnosticity and serendipity (Yi et al. 2017). Yi et al define 
diagnosticity as users’ perception of how helpful a website is in helping the user to evaluate the 
relevant products in a search process, and define serendipity as the users’ perception of how 
helpful a website is in helping a user discover products beyond their original expectation. But 
what still remains unanswered is how digital content provider platforms can influence the search 
behavior and discovery of their users that will increase the user’s engagement with the platform. 
Therefore, it is important for IS literature to focus on design features that can help platforms 
achieve the goal of increased user engagement. 
Prior research suggests that design features and informational signals are helpful to 
platforms in engaging their users, enabling desirable user behavior, and increasing revenue (Aral, 
Dellarocas, et al. 2013; S Dewan et al. 2017; Godes et al. 2005).. To this end, studies have 
looked at effect of incentive schemas (Aral, Muchnik, et al. 2013), active-personalized referrals 
and passive broadcast notification (Aral and Walker 2011), features that facilitate peer 
endorsement and referrals (Dou et al. 2013), social product search cues (Yi et al. 2017), among 
others. Particularly, as the availability of information signals (in the forms of ratings, reviews, or 
aggregated consumption metric) is expected to create social influence, some studies have 
focused on the effect of these informational signals on sales (Moretti 2011; Svedic 2015; Yang et 
al. 2012), amount of consumption (Amblee and Bui 2007; Sanjeev Dewan et al. 2017; Zhou and 
Duan 2016), and search costs (Amblee et al. 2017). However, there is a gap in our understanding 
of how these informational signals can improve user engagement. Further, the effect of 
informational signals has mostly been studied  contingent on only presence or absence of them 
(Amblee et al. 2017; Amblee and Bui 2007; Sanjeev Dewan et al. 2017). The information 
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signals, however, may have other influential attributes such as whether the signals are aligned 
with each other (conveying consistent information to the user) or in conflict with each other 
(conveying conflicting information to the user). To examine the interplay between the two 
information signals, we aim at answering the question of how the conflict between these signals 
can influence user engagement. 
In this study, we focus on how availability and conflict of information signals like ratings 
and reviews can influence and improve user engagement. We build on prior studies to examine 
how users can be motivated by information signals like ratings and reviews to explore content  
(Amblee et al. 2017; Yi et al. 2017). We draw on information foraging theory (IFT) and the 
social information foraging model (SIF) to examine how information signals can influence 
search behavior of users and lead to more user engagement and improved discovery. IFT 
proposes a model that explains the cue-following behavior of an information-seeker in the task 
environment. The information is dispersed in patches and the information scent and search cues 
can help the information forager effectively search in the environment and collect valuable 
information. SIF complements IFT by considering the situations where a (diverse) group of 
information-foragers cooperate and engage in social exchange of information (hints).  (Pirolli 
2009; Pirolli and Card 1999). SIF suggests that when individuals are offered heterogeneous 
hints, their sense-making is improved and the likelihood of high-valued discoveries is increased. 
Analogously, when the platforms provide users with information signals, it enables sharing 
information and hints between information-seekers by disseminating information to them. 
Therefore, this study aims to address the following research questions: 
 
1) How does the availability of information signals influence user engagement on online 
content platforms? 
54
  
2) How does the availability of conflicting information signals influence discovery on online 
content platforms? 
We investigate our research objectives in the context of music streaming platforms. Like 
other platforms, the mission of a music streaming platform is to facilitate the interactions 
between its participants: the music consumers and the music artists. On the music streaming 
platforms, music consumers can browse and search catalogs, gain access to a wide variety of 
songs, and “stream” music they like. On the other side of these platforms are the music artists, 
relying on music streaming services to reach out to a bigger audience, gain revenue and make a 
strong fan base. By connecting the two sides of this market, music streaming platforms are 
helping the music industry recover after two decades of decline in revenues due to piracy and 
falling prices. Being the music industry’s fastest growing revenue source, the US streaming 
music platforms accounted for about 66 percent of the music industry revenue in 2017, showing 
a continuous growth similar to 2016.  (Friedlander 2018; Shaw 2016). 
In the music streaming marketplace, multiple platforms are competing to attract users and 
gain revenue from ads and subscription fees. As such, the number of subscribers is one of the 
most commonly used metrics to compare the success of these platforms. While the number of 
subscribers (and free users) is one measure of success, it is also important to consider the extent 
to which those users are engaged with the platform (Constine 2015). More engagement with the 
platform by spending more time or creating numerous playlists makes the platform more 
valuable to the user and creates a switching cost. User engagement is typically measured by the 
number of hours users spend on the platform, the number of playlists created by the users, and 
the number of the streams of the songs (Statista 2013). Music discovery also is very important to 
keep users engaged with the platform (Admirand 2015). Music discovery occurs when a music 
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listener is uncertain about the music s/he wants to listen to, and browses an available music 
collection to discover new music (Bogdanov et al. 2010). Engaging in music discovery entails 
spending time to discover, adding new songs to playlists and discovering diverse songs. 
Recognizing the importance of music discovery, music streaming platforms have taken 
action to facilitate this aspect and they take pride in their discovery credentials. Spotify offers its 
users a personalized weekly playlist every Monday morning, “Discover Weekly”, to bring new 
discoveries matching the users’ listening profile (Spotify 2015). Following suit, Apple Music 
started releasing a weekly mix every Friday, called “My New Music Mix”, to offer music 
discovery (Perez 2016). In addition to offering curated playlists to facilitate discovery, it is also 
vital for platforms to understand how they can influence users’ behavior in terms of music 
discovery and engagement by managing social interactions and facilitating spread of information 
(Aral, Dellarocas, et al. 2013; Godes et al. 2005). In this study, we examine how music streaming 
platforms can improve user engagement and diversity of discovery by providing users with 
information signals.  
This paper is organized as following. In the next section, we review the theoretical 
framework and propose our hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes our research methodology. In 
section 3.4 we discuss our data collection and provide summary of results. Conclusion and 
discussion on the findings of this study are presented in section 3.5. 
 
3.2 THEOREICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this section, we first draw on the digital platforms literature to shed light on why monitoring 
metrics related to user engagement is important for digital content provider platforms. Next, we 
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review prior works that have looked at the effect of designing with social features and offering 
information signals on improving the outcome variables of interest for platforms. Then we draw 
on information foraging theory (IFT) and the social information foraging model (SIF) to address 
the gap in our understanding and hypothesize on how the availability and conflicting information 
signals influence user engagement and discovery.  
 
3.2.1 Platform Markets   
A platform market is characterized by the interaction of at least two sides of a market (the 
complementor and the consumer) through an intermediary (i.e. the platform) (Katz and Shapiro 
1985; Rochet and Tirole 2003). In recent years and with wide spread adoption of the Internet, the 
platform business model has been widely adopted to enable the interaction between market 
participants over the Internet, such as digital content providers (enabling interaction between 
content owners and content consumers). For a platform to achieve success, not only is it 
important to get customers and complementors adopt the platform, but it is also important to get 
them to use the platform. This is due to the presence of indirect network effects on platforms, 
where the gain for an agent on one side is commensurate with the number of agents on the other 
side (Farrell and Klemperer 2007; Katz and Shapiro 1985). Another successful competing 
strategy for a platform is to create a switching cost for its consumers. Platforms can create 
features that in turn lead to potential switching costs for customers. Categories of switching costs 
include transaction cost, cost of learning the new brand and the psychological cost incurred due 
to brand-loyalty (Klemperer 1995). Additionally, platforms can compete with each other by 
leveraging the value of data and enhancing the platform design. For example, platforms can 
utilize data on user behavior and test the performance of and optimize particular features. Data 
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analytics can significantly help the platform company invest in design and greatly increase the 
value generated for users and the company. The optimization of features can further assist the 
platforms, enhance the platform design, and facilitate interactions (Parker et al. 2016).  
Digital content provider platforms also focus on the design of their platforms and the 
quality of tools they provide to compete. For example, design of a recommendation system that 
can provide utility to users and the platform have received a lot of attention both in the industry 
(Arora 2016; Katz 2012) and in the academic literature (Bogdanov et al. 2010; Davidson et al. 
2010; Knees and Schedl 2013). But beyond the starting point of a corpus of content curated by 
the recommendation system, it can help platforms further keep their users engaged by enabling 
them to explore and discover content. As users become capable of discovering content, they are 
more likely to use the platform more frequently and consequently their level of engagement 
increases. Additionally, with more use and engagement, consumers’ switching cost increases, 
which further helps platforms gain a competitive advantage. Aral et al suggest that the IS 
literature can focus on employing social design and features to answer the question of how 
platforms can invoke user engagement and enable desired user behavior. In this study, we aim at 
answering this question.  
 
3.2.2 Social design 
As an increasing number of platforms are integrated with social networks, it becomes crucial to 
examine how platforms can view this integration as a key resource and understand its potential to 
create more value. An important consequence of incorporating a social network into platforms is 
the increased opportunity of social interactions among users, both at the same sides of the 
platform and across. As social interactions are found to influence a user’s behavior, it is up to 
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platforms to decide how they can leverage this influence to achieve their goals by managing the 
social interactions. Godes et al. (2005) suggest that firms can benefit from social interactions by 
actively fostering and managing them. Possible actions are shaping the social network, 
facilitating the spread of information and imposing how and to whom information will be 
disseminated.  
Aral et al. (2013) further discuss how businesses are being transformed by social media 
and social networks. They propose a taxonomy of dimensions along which IS research can focus 
to answer the question of how platforms can use social networks to create value.  The framework 
introduces four categories of activities to describe how social media can be leveraged: design and 
features, strategy and tactics, management and organization, and measurement and value (Aral, 
Dellarocas, et al. 2013). Our study fits within this framework by filling the gap in our 
understanding of social media and business transformation in the areas of “design and features” 
and “measurement and value”. In the area of “design and features”, we contribute to the 
literature on how specific features and designs help platforms attract users, create engagement, 
enable and constrain user behavior, and increase revenue. Additionally, in the area of 
“measurement and value”, we contribute to a body of work that has mostly focused on the 
relationship between social media and consumer choice in purchase context by looking beyond 
purchases and measuring the value of social media in influencing users’ engagement and 
discovery.  
 
3.2.3 Social influence 
There is a rich body of literature on how firms and platforms can exploit social design and 
features to achieve their goals and create value (Table 13 provides a summary of representative 
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studies). Similar to Aral et al’s observation (Aral, Dellarocas, et al. 2013), in our survey of prior 
works we see a focus on measuring the added value of social design mainly in influencing 
consumer’s decision in the adoption and purchase contexts. Aral and Walker examine the 
effectiveness of using two viral design features, active-personalized referrals and passive-
broadcast notifications, on a peer’s adoption decision in the context of Facebook applications. 
They find that for the users facing viral product design features implemented in the application, 
there is an increase in the rate of application adoption by peers (Aral and Walker 2011). Another 
study in the context of online music-sharing platforms examines the effect of an individual’s 
adoption of the premium subscription on her peers’ adoption decision. Bapna et al (2015) find 
that the effect of peer influence is significant, leading to an increase in peers’ adoption of the 
premium service. In the purchase and consumption contexts, Dou et al (2013) analytically model 
and evaluate the effectiveness and the trade-off between word-of-mouth strategies, seeding and 
building social media features, on user’s willingness to pay in the context of paid digital goods. 
Proposing another analytical model, Jiang and Guo (2015) examine the effectiveness of review 
system design decision of rating scale cardinality on users’ perception of ratings and product 
sales. The result of the analytical model cautions the firms about considering the characteristics 
of the products (product valuation and mainstream level) and consumers (misfit cost) when 
designing a rating system.  
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Table 13. Literature review on platforms’s use of social design 
 
Authors Title Journal Dependent 
variable(s) 
Independent 
variable(s) 
Context Method 
Liu (2006) Word of Mouth for 
Movies: Its 
Dynamics and 
Impact on Box 
Office Revenue 
Journal of 
Marketing 
Movie sales  volume and valence of 
WOM  
Digital goods 
(movies) 
Empirical 
(secondary 
data) 
Amblee and 
Bui (2007) 
Freeware 
Downloads: An 
Empirical 
Investigation Into 
the Impact of 
Expert and User 
Reviews On 
Demand for 
Digital Goods 
AMCIS 
Proceedings 
Number of 
downloads 
availability of either or 
both expert reviews 
and user reviews 
Digital goods 
(freeware)  
Empirical 
(secondary 
data) 
Zhu and 
Zhang (2010) 
Impact of Online 
Consumer Reviews 
on Sales : The 
Moderating Role 
of Product and 
Consumer 
Characteristics 
Journal of 
Marketing 
Product sales  Online reviews 
moderated by product 
characteristics 
(popularity) and 
consumer 
characteristics 
(Internet experience) 
Video games  Empirical 
(secondary 
data) 
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Chakravarty, 
Liu and 
Mazumdar 
(2010) 
The Differential 
Effects of Online 
Word-of-Mouth 
and Critics' 
Reviews on Pre-
release Movie 
Evaluation 
Journal of 
Interactive 
Marketing 
Evaluation of a 
movie 
Availability and 
valence of two 
information source: 
critic's review and 
word-of-mouth 
Digital goods 
(movies) 
Lab 
experiment  
Gray, 
Salvatore and 
Iyer (2011) 
Innovation impacts 
of using social 
bookmarking 
systems 
MIS Quarterly level of 
individual's 
personal 
innovativeness 
Number of times 
social bookmarks are 
accessed, number of 
people whose social 
bookmarks an 
individual accesses,  
diversity of people 
whose social 
bookmarks an 
individual accesses 
Social 
bookmarking 
system  
Empirical 
(using 
secondary 
data and 
survey data) 
Aral and 
Walker 
(2011) 
Creating Social 
Contagion 
Through Viral 
Product Design: A 
Randomized Trial 
of Peer Influence 
in Networks 
Management 
Science 
Adoption 
response of peers 
Availability of viral 
features: active-
personalized referrals 
and passive-broadcast 
notifications 
Facebook 
application  
Randomized 
field 
experiment 
Fong (2012) Targeted 
Marketing and 
Customer Search 
NA-Advances in 
Consumer 
Researc 
Consumer 
exploration and 
discovery 
Personalized targeted 
marketing 
Retail  Field 
experiment  
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Yang, Kim, 
Amblee and 
Jeong (2012) 
The heterogeneous 
effect of WOM on 
product sales: why 
the effect of WOM 
valence is mixed? 
European 
Journal of 
Marketing 
Product sales  Volume and valence 
of WOM moderated 
by the product 
charactetistics 
(mainstream vs. niche) 
Digital 
experience 
goods (movies)  
Empirical 
(using 
archival and 
secondary 
data) 
Aral, 
Muchnik and 
Sundararajan 
(2013) 
Engineering social 
contagions: 
Optimal network 
seeding in the 
presence of 
homophily 
Network 
Science 
Peer's product 
adoption  
Availabiity of either or 
both WOM strategies:  
seending and incentive 
Digital product 
adoption  
Simulation 
and empircal  
Dou, 
Niculescu and 
Wu (2013) 
Engineering 
optimal network 
effects via social 
media features and 
seeding in markets 
for digital goods 
and services 
Information 
Systems 
Research 
Willingness to 
pay  
Seeding and building 
social media features 
into digital products 
Paid digital 
goods (e.g. 
professional 
social network, 
dating sites) 
Analytical 
modeling  
Bapna and 
Umyarov 
(2015) 
Do Your Online 
Friends Make You 
Pay? A 
Randomized Field 
Experiment on 
Peer Influence in 
Online Social 
Networks 
Management 
Science 
Peer's 
subscription to 
premium service 
Individul's receiving 
of a sucscription to 
premium service as a 
gift moderated by 
peer's network size 
Music-
listening social 
network  
Randomized 
field 
Experiment 
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Jiang and 
Guo (2015) 
Design of 
Consumer Review 
Systems and 
Product Pricing 
Information 
Systems 
Research 
Review 
outcomes and 
product sales  
Review system design 
decisions: rating scale 
cardinality, showing 
granular reports; 
moderated by the 
product characteristics 
(product valuation and 
mainstream level) and 
consumer 
characteristics 
(consumer misfit 
costs) 
e-commerce  Analytical 
modeling  
Zhou and 
Duan (2016) 
Do Professional 
Reviews Affect 
Online User 
Choices Through 
User Reviews? An 
Empirical Study 
Journal of 
Management 
Information 
Systems 
Number of 
downloads 
The interplay between 
two WOM sources: 
professional reviews 
and user reviews 
Online 
software 
market  
Empircal 
(secondary 
data) 
Yi, Jiang and 
Benbasat 
(2017) 
Designing for 
Diagnosticity and 
Serendipity: An 
Investigation of 
Social Product-
Search Mechnisms 
Information 
Systems 
Research 
Perceived 
diagnosticity and 
serendipity opf 
search 
experience, 
deicision 
satisfaction  
Availability of social 
product search cues: 
product tags and 
socially endorsed 
people 
Social-
networked-
based product-
search website 
Lab 
experiment  
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Dewan, Ho 
and 
Ramaprasad 
(2017)  
Popularity or 
Proximity: 
Characterizing the 
Nature of Social 
Influence in an 
Online Music 
Community 
Information 
Systems 
Research 
Number of song 
plays 
Availability of either 
or both information 
signals on popularity 
in the community and 
among friends 
Online music 
community  
Quasi-
experiment  
Amblee, 
Ullah and 
Wonjoo 
(2017) 
Do Product 
Reviews Really 
Reduce Search 
Costs? 
Journal of 
Organizational 
Computing and 
Electronic 
Commerce 
Search cost 
measured as time 
spent on task and 
cognitive effort, 
decision 
confidence 
Availability of either 
or both editorial 
reviews and customer 
reviews 
Information 
search and 
decision 
making  
Lab 
experiment  
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Furthermore, many studies have looked at the effect of availability of information signals 
from different sources of online word-of-mouth on consumers’ evaluation of products and 
product sales. In the context of movie sales, Liu (2006) studied the effect of volume and valence 
of word-of-mouth from forum message boards on box office revenue and investigated its 
dynamic effect in the pre-release and the early weeks of opening. Liu found that volume but not 
the valence of WOM offers significant exploratory power for box office revenue. Amblee and 
Bui (2007) tested the effect of availability of either or both expert reviews and user reviews on 
the number of downloads of freeware in the digital goods context and found that the existence of 
the signals increase the number of downloads but the valence of reviews does not matter. To 
further examine the contextual factors moderating the effect of word-of-mouth, Yang et al (2012) 
proposed and tested the moderating role of product characteristics (mainstream vs. niche). They 
examined how the volume and valence of WOM affect sales of movies. They found that volume 
of WOM has positive and greater effect on sales for mainstream movies than niche movies. The 
effect of valence of WOM is also positive but it is greater for niche movies than mainstream 
movies. In more recent work and in the context of online music communities, Dewan et al (2017) 
investigate the effect of availability of information signals from two sources of word-of-mouth, 
the popularity in the community as a whole (popularity influence) and the popularity among an 
individual’s peers (proximity influence). They found that both information signals increase the 
number of plays when offered separately, but that proximity influence dominates the effect of 
popularity influence when both are available. 
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3.2.4 Search experience: user engagement   
While there has been a plethora of studies on how social design in general and online word-of-
mouth in particular affect outcomes in purchase and adoption contexts, little attention has been 
paid to the emerging outcomes of interest for content platforms such as user engagement and 
discovery. For online platforms, generating revenue from subscription fees is fundamental 
(Gallaugher et al. 2001) and therefore the number of subscribed users is an important measure of 
success. Additionally, purchase or consumption behavior measured as willingness to pay, 
product sales or amount of consumption can also positively influence profit and revenue. 
However, due to the importance of emerging metrics such as user engagement and discovery for 
online content platforms, it becomes vital to further investigate the behavior of users. It raises the 
question of to what extent subscribed users engage with a platform and explore its content. In the 
case of consumption, it is important to investigate whether consumers are exploring and 
diversifying their consumption. 
In a recent study, Yi et al (2017) investigated how design can influence the search 
experience of users. They examined the effect of availability of two social product search cues: 
product tags and socially endorsed people on users’ search experience. The two outcome 
variables of interest focused on the search experience are perceived serendipity, defined as the 
extent to which a website helps finding useful but unexpected content, and the perceived 
diagnosticity, defined as the extent to which a website is helpful in effectively accessing and 
evaluating relevant products. This study found that the presence of tags increased perceived 
serendipity and diagnosticity of search experience. In another recent study, Amblee et al also 
focused on the search behavior and examined how availability of either or both editorial reviews 
and customer reviews influence search costs (both in terms of time spend and cognitive effort 
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required). They found that the availability of either of these information signals reduce search 
costs but when both are available, the search cost is not reduced. However, decision confidence 
is boosted with simultaneous availability of these two signals. We contribute to this body of 
research by improving our understanding of how social design and information signals through 
word-of-mouth can influence and improve user engagement and divergent and serendipitous 
discovery. To this end, we build on prior studies that have examined the effects of word-of-
mouth and we draw from information foraging theory (IFT) and the social information foraging 
model (SIF).  
 
3.2.5 Information foraging 
IFT models the information seeking behavior of an information forager in the task environment. 
The information is often dispersed in patches in the environment, and the information scent from 
each patch help the forager evaluate the profitability and prevalence of information source. In the 
absence of information scent, the forager has to perform a random walk in the task environment. 
In the presence of information scent,  scent-following behavior is dynamic and if the scent is 
strong enough, the forager can make correct decisions and maximize the discovered information 
(Peter Pirolli and Card 1999). 
The information foragers in a task environment may also cooperate and share information 
with each other that can help each individual increase their finding of discovered information. 
This cooperation between the information foragers is particularly important given the rise of the 
Internet, Web 2.0 and mobile communications. Information foraging has become a social task 
which involves many interacting users actively foraging and sharing information, rather than a 
being solo foragers. Borrowing insights from structural hole theory and examining the network 
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of the foraging users, Pirolli explains that when a user is connected to diverse and densely 
connected clusters, he is in a brokerage position and has an advantage of exposure to greater 
diversity. The brokerage position is contrary to a position where an information forager is 
surrounded by homogenous opinions, viewpoint and information resource. The homogeneity of 
received information is likely to produce redundant findings (Pirolli 2009). Social foraging 
theory (SIF) builds on the notion that when a group of differing information foragers cooperate 
and engage in social exchanges of information (or hints), they bridge across content areas and 
information social groups.  In such settings, individuals cooperate and exchange information 
with different networks.  Sharing of heterogeneous hints is expected to improve individual's 
sense making and foraging and increases the likelihood of discovering useful information. 
In a recent study, Yi et al draw on IFT and SIF to explore the effect of social design on 
consumer’s search experience (Yi et al. 2017). They examine the influence of social design on 
the diagnosticity and serendipity of users’ search experiences. In this study, we build on studies 
that have examined effects of online word-of-mouth as an example of information signal and 
examine its effect on a user’s search experience. Since online word-of-mouth has been found to 
influence consumer’s choice, we expect that it can effectively work as an information scent and 
guide the user in the task environment. Therefore, we examine how information signals influence 
user’s information search and outcome in online content platforms. In particular, in this study we 
examine the effect of two types of information signals that have been found to influence amount 
of consumption in online content websites (Sanjeev Dewan et al. 2017), namely the popularity of 
content in the community as a whole (popularity on platform) and popularity of content among 
peers (popularity among peers).  Drawing from the SIF, we hypothesize that availability of 
information signals in the forms of popularity on platform and popularity among peers will 
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create a strong scent that can guide the user in the task environment. By making these two 
popularity information signals available, the platform is implicitly facilitating the sharing of the 
hints from other information foragers (users), which SIF suggests will increase the discovery on 
the platform. 
Additionally, when popularity on platform and popularity among peers are both present, 
these two information signals can be in conflict with each other, influencing the user’s search 
behavior. Dewan et al did not find an interaction between the two signals. However, they only 
allow for interaction of the two signals with regards to their presence and absence. The SIF 
model suggests that when the user receives heterogeneous information hints, the scent becomes 
stronger as it breaks the homogeneity and redundancy of the hints. This further enables the 
information forager to explore and find valuable music. In this study, we are examining whether 
conflicting information signals can work as heterogonous information hints and increase a user’s 
engagement and discovery on the platform. Thus, we hypothesize that:  
 
H1a: All else equal, users exposed to conflicting information signals have higher levels of 
platform engagement than users exposed to aligned information signals.  
 
H1b: All else equal, users exposed to conflicting information signals have higher levels of 
platform engagement than users exposed to no information signals.  
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3.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
To test our hypotheses, we deploy a randomized between-subject field experiment to collect real 
user behavior for a real-world music platform. We manipulate the independent variable (i.e. 
availability of conflicting information signals). As the dependent variable, we are measuring the 
user’s engagement and discovery on the platform. 
 
3.3.1 Field experiment setting 
We test our hypotheses on a social platform mobile application, Rapchat, where users can record 
their own songs and also explore and find songs created by other users. The users on this 
platform are both content creators and content consumers. Since the users as content consumers 
do not have prior familiarity with the content creators or the available content on the platform, it 
is crucial for this platform to invoke and increase discovery of content. The app is designed to 
encourage discovery of songs and artists by having a discovery tab where users can find songs 
and artists. (Figure 6 and Figure 7). This feature makes this app an appropriate setting for our 
study to investigate how such platforms can improve user engagement and discovery. The app 
also offers the functionality of users following each other’s profile on the platform and creating a 
social network. The possibility of forming a social network on this platform allows for creation 
of popularity information signal among a given user’s social network, making this platform suit 
our experimental needs. This mobile application has more than 120 thousand monthly active 
users. The social networking feature is used extensively: 57% of the users follow at least one 
other user and 36% of the users have at least one follower. An average user follows 24 other 
users and has 36 followers.  
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Figure 6. Discover tab on the social music platform mobile application for song discovery 
 
Figure 7. Discover tab on the social music platform mobile application for artist discovery 
 
3.3.2 Experimental design 
In order to test for the effectiveness of the availability of conflicting popularity information 
signals, we develop two popularity scores for the songs, one is based on all the users on the 
platform (popularity on platform) and the other is based on only the users a focal user is 
following (popularity among peers). Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively depict the graphics used 
to convey the two information signals of interest to our study:  popularity on platform and 
popularity among peers.  Using colors, we visualize the popularity as being very low (in a white 
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color), low (in a yellow color), medium (in an orange color) or high (in a red color). Next, we 
randomly choose users and assign them to one of the three treatment groups. 
 
 
Figure 8. Graphical depiction of popularity on platform information signal 
 
Figure 9. Graphical depiction of popularity among peers’ information signal 
For the first treatment group, we do not show any of the two popularity information 
signals (Figure 10). In the second experiment group, users are exposed to the default information 
signals of the app (the number of likes, comments and plays for a song) (Figure 11). In the next 
treatment group, users are exposed to both popularity on platform and popularity among peers 
information signals, and the two signals are randomly assigned such that the two signals are 
aligned with each other (Figure 12).  In the last treatment group, users are exposed to both 
popularity on platform and popularity among peers’ information signals, and the two signals are 
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randomly assigned such that the two signals are in conflict with each other (Figure 13). Table 14 
summarizes the experiment groups and the treatment conditions. 
 
Figure 10. Design of the app for treatment group with no signal 
 
 
Figure 11. Design of the app for control group with default signal 
 
Figure 12. Design of the app for treatment group with conflicting signals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. Experiment treatment conditions 
Treatment Experiment Group 
No Signal 1 
Platform Default Signal 2 
Aligned Signals 3 
Conflicting Signals 4 
 
 
Figure 13. Design of the app for treatment group with aligned signals 
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3.4 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
3.4.1 Sample 
Our sample includes 199 users, with 50 users in the no signal, default signal and conflicting 
signals groups, and 49 users in the aligned signals group. These users are randomly drawn from 
the pool of active users on the platform who have formed a social network of at least one person 
on the platform. 
 
3.4.2  Variables 
To measure dependent variables, we focus on users’ search behavior and outcomes. We evaluate 
engagement and discovery by measuring the number of songs the user plays and the number of 
profiles of artists the user views in order to learn more about the artist. We also use the number 
of sessions started by the user as a covariate. This variable shows to be different among different 
experiment groups, and we control for it to account for variation in the amount of time the user 
spent in the experiment (See Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14. Number of sessions started in experiment groups 
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Table 15. Key variables and definitions 
Variable Definition 
Songs_played Number of songs the user played 
Profiles_viewed Number of artists’ profiles viewed 
Sessions_started Number of sessions started on the app 
 
3.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and control variable is presented in Table 
16. In Table 17 and Figure 15, the cell means for the experiment groups are presented. Table 18 
presents the correlation between these variables. 
Table 16. Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Songs_played 199 13.47 47.02 0 586 
Profiles_viewed 199 9.63 25.30 0 237 
Sessions_started 199 3.91 6.42 0 36 
 
Table 17. Cell means 
treatment Songs_played Profiles_viewed Sessions_started 
No signal 6.94 5.2 2.82 
Current Platform Default 7.96 6.04 5.34 
Aligned signals 13.28 10.94 4.75 
Conflicting signals 25.68 16.38 2.74 
 
Table 18. Correlation matrix 
 Songs_played Profiles_viewed Sessions_started 
Songs_played 1   
Profiles_viewed 0.49 1  
Sessions_started 0.27 0.47 1 
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Figure 1. Cell means for dependent variables 
3.4.4 Summary of results 
To evaluate the hypothesis, we performed between-subject multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) on Songs_played and Profiles_viewed, as a function of the treatment groups (no 
signal, default signal, aligned signals and conflicting signals) and Sessions_started as a covariate. 
The summary of results is presented in Table 19. Pillai’s trace test revealed a significant 
difference between treatments in influencing engagement (p<0.01).  
Table 19. Results of MANOVA 
Effect df F Sig. 
Model 4 11.54 0.0000 
Treatment 3 2.93 0.0083 
Sessions_started 1 34.42 0.0000 
• Pillai’s trace test statistics are reported 
 
We then proceeded to evaluate the hypothesis to examine whether the treatment with the 
conflicting signals results in significantly higher engagement and discovery than other 
treatments. Post estimation tests show that the treatment of conflicting signals results in greater 
engagement and discovery than when the users are exposed to no information signals (Pillai’s 
Trace = 7.71, p < 0.001). Further, we compare the users exposed to conflicting signals with the 
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users who are exposed to the platform default signal and we find that the conflicting signals 
result in greater engagement and discovery than the default signal of the platform (Pillai’s Trace 
= 6.98, p < 0.001). Lastly, to evaluate the effectiveness of the conflicting and aligned 
information signals, we compare the two treatment conditions, and the results suggest that the 
conflicting signals do a significantly better job in increasing users’ engagement and discovery on 
the platform (Pillai’s Trace = 2.87, p < 0.05). The results provide support for the proposed 
hypothesis of this study that the conflicting signals result in greater engagement and discovery by 
creating strong social information scent and influencing the users’ search behavior in the 
environment (i.e. the music platform). Further, as a robustness check we evaluate the same 
model and perform the hypotheses tests without including the covariate in the model. The results 
remain consistent with the model which includes the covariate. 
3.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The empirical question in this study is how digital content platforms can improve user 
engagement and discovery by exploiting elements of social design. Improving user engagement 
and discovery is critical for platforms as they are characterized by network effects, and higher 
volume of usage on one side (users) can encourage more activities on the other side (i.e. artists). 
Given the integration of platforms with social networks, relying on social influence can be a key 
strategy in invoking desired user behavior. By adopting the information foraging theory and 
social foraging model, in this study we evaluated how the use of popularity information signals, 
and the alignment or the conflict between signals, can increase user engagement and discovery. 
The results of a randomized field experiment in the context of a music mobile platform 
app show that the use of popularity information signals can provide strong information scent, 
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guiding the users’ search behavior and increasing user engagement and discovery. We find that 
when users are exposed to conflicting information signals, this leads to significantly greater 
engagement and discovery, measured as the number of songs played and the number of artists’ 
profiles viewed.  
This significance difference is observed when comparing exposure to conflicting signals 
with exposure to aligned signals, default signal of the platform and no signal. This finding is 
consistent with the model of information foraging behavior in the social foraging model. 
Accordingly, when information foragers (i.e. users) have access to diverse and non-redundant 
information hints from other users, they can maximize their finding of valuable information in 
their search. The implications of these findings for content platforms is that they can effectively 
rely on elements of social design in invoking desired user behavior. In doing so, platforms can 
capitalize on the presence of conflicting feedback and providing users with such signals to 
increase the diversity of information hints and reduce redundancy.   
Additionally, given that content platforms are characterized by network effects, more 
engagement and discovery on the side of users can encourage and increase motivations for 
content providers and artists to contribute more to the platform. While in this study we focus on 
outcomes of interest on the users’ side (i.e. engagement and discovery), future research can 
expand on the possible cross-side effects of users’ exposure to conflicting signals on the content 
providers behavior. Other potential implications of users’ exposure to conflicting information 
signals can be observed in the extent to which they explore and listen to familiar vs. novel 
content and artists and how this may influence the content providers’ behavior differently. 
For digital content platform businesses, improved loyalty of users can also be a critical 
success metric. As users listen to more songs, and also view more artists’ profiles on the 
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platform, they can discover more content that they find valuable, and thereby increase their 
loyalty to the app. Given that the conflicting information signals lead to great engagement and 
discovery on digital content platforms, by extension they may also result in more user 
satisfaction and loyalty to the app.  Future work can focus on how exposure to conflicting signals 
can influence users’ satisfaction in their search behavior and loyalty to the platform. 
Additionally, further research using lab experiments can expand on how these conflicting 
information signals influence users’ decision-making process that leads to more engagement and 
discovery of songs and artists. By adopting decision-making frameworks used in search contexts, 
we can further analyze the process through which the conflicting signals influence users’ 
engagement and discovery on the platform.  
Moving forward, one main limitation of our study that leaves room for further 
investigation into the effect of conflicting signals is that our analysis is performed at the user 
level. Alternatively, we can study the effect of conflicting information signals at the song level. 
From the perspective of a song-level analysis we can gain insight into how the conflicting signals 
influence the extent to which songs with different characteristics, as well as their artists, are 
played or viewed and receive attention from users. 
Our study contributes to the literature on platform businesses, business transformation 
and social media. Platform businesses adopt a myriad of strategies to gain competitive 
advantage. One such strategy is to improve the design of the platform. In this study, we evaluate 
how adopting such a strategy and exploiting elements of social design in the design of the 
platform can help content platforms improve success metrics of user engagement and discovery. 
Further, while prior works in the areas of business transformation and social media have widely 
focused on social influence and its business value in the context of adoption or purchase of 
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products, we broaden the scope of measurement and value by evaluating the impact of social 
influence on engagement and discovery of users. Further, we expand on how social influence can 
be a driver of behavior by allowing variation in the alignment (or lack thereof) of the social 
information signals influencing users’ behavior.  
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4.0 Diversification Strategy for Mobile App Developers: 
Understanding the Role of App Category Characteristics 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
With the maturity of mobile app platforms and continuous growth of the app business, more and 
more app developers are focusing on strategically positioning their apps to increase visibility and 
improve profitability. The global mobile app revenue forecast for the year 2020 is $189 billion, 
and has become a part of the world economy (Dogtiev 2017). To be able to appropriate this 
economic pie, strategic decision making on the side of app developers becomes crucial.  
One such strategic decision is to decide for which app categories to develop to ensure 
growth and higher return on investment. For app developers, this is essentially a decision of which 
battleground to enter where their apps can have a higher chance of survival and success. However, 
such a decision can present a challenge as on one hand, the popularity of an app category may lure 
developers to it on the level of step into a category with a large demand (and hence a high adoption 
rate) , but on the other hand, which a popular category can be highly competitive and dominated 
by strong incumbents, which makes it difficult for new apps to stand out, gain visibility and earn 
revenue. 
For app developers, making sensible business decisions requires an understanding of the 
economics underlying the market (Ifrach and Johari 2013) and not accounting for the potential 
effect of these app category’s competitive characteristics on the developer’s performance can have 
unwanted consequences. In one famous instance, Twitter recently switched its category from the 
more popular “Social Networking” category to  the “News” category that is less crowded, largely 
due to the fact that the Social Networking category is strongly dominated by Facebook and other 
social networking giants (Perez 2016). Presumable, the purpose of the change was to give the 
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	Twitter app more visibility and improve its adoption. Such a strategic move also indicates the 
importance of the category characteristic on the app development strategy and market 
performance.   
The choice of app category is a common decision faced by both new developers and 
experienced developers who aim at improving their performance and gaining more revenue by 
diversifying their app offerings into different app categories. The choice of app category is 
extremely important for new developers as a good beginning lays a solid foundation for the 
subsequent growth and opens up the opportunity to expand into other categories. It is also crucial 
for established developers who want to leverage their current user base and diversify their product 
space. In the mobile app market, product diversification is a strategy widely adopted by app 
developers, and about 60 percent of developers have apps in more than one category (Lee and 
Raghu 2014).  
The effects of the choice of app category and diversification on developers’ performance 
depend on different factors such as app category characteristics and the competitive dynamics. 
Prior works in other industries (e.g. packaged software, video games) have looked at firms’ product 
release and diversification attempts within an industry and into different product-markets. These 
studies show that the features of the product-market into which a firm enters influence the firm’s 
performance. These features include competition within a product-market and popularity of the 
product-market based on the demand for it (Boudreau 2010; Cennamo and Santalo 2010; 
Markovich and Moenius 2009; Simonsohn 2010).  
As mobile app platforms are characterized by the presence of network effects, these 
features of product-markets (i.e. app categories) are expected to play a strong role in influencing 
developers’ decision making as well as their performance. In markets characterized by network 
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	effects, a tension exists between two opposing forces: category concentration and category 
popularity. The category concentration increases as the competition within a category becomes 
more intense and more strong incumbents become dominant, making it harder for a developer to 
gain market share from the incumbents. This leads to a competition effect due to “congestion or 
glut of developers” (Boudreau 2012).  The positive indirect network effect, on the other hand, is 
triggered as the category becomes more popular and enjoys a stronger demand (Venkatraman and 
Lee 2004). On mobile app platforms, there is very little understanding on how a developer should 
choose which categories to develop for, given the varying levels of competition and popularity 
across app categories.  
As the developers decide which app category to develop for, the consequence of this 
decision depends on the category concentration and popularity. The category popularity 
determines the amount of demand available for all the apps in that category and a higher popularity 
means a bigger “pie” for everyone. The category concentration determines the extent to which 
other strong and powerful developers are competing to take a bigger share from the same “pie”. A 
higher concentration means that the market is dominated by very few strong competitors and it is 
more challenging to gain a share of the market than when the market is relatively equally shared 
among all competitors. Furthermore, as the influence of category popularity and concentration on 
the developers’ performance is more predictable, the trade-off between the two is ambiguous. It is 
unclear whether the stronger user base and the associated positive indirect network effects brought 
by a high popularity would make up for the intense competition and other negative effects of high 
category concentration; or that the negative effect of category concentration would outweigh the 
positive impact of category popularity and negatively influence the app’s performance. Given 
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	these uncertainties, in this study, we focus on examining how category concentration and category 
popularity interact and influence the outcome of developers’ app diversification strategy. 
 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
	
	
4.2.1 Diversification strategy and the choice of product-market 
	
Mobile app developers adopt different strategies to improve their performance on the platform and 
gain more revenue. One such strategy to improve developers’ performance is the diversification 
of app offerings across categories. The diversification strategy is appealing for app developers 
because it enables them to benefit from heterogeneity of users’ needs and taste (Bayus and Putsis 
Jr 1999; Brynjolfsson et al. 2011), exploit economies of scope (Cottrell and Nault 2004; Li and 
Greenwood 2004), avoid failure due to concentrated focus on one category (Cottrell and Nault 
2004; Lee and Raghu 2014; Li et al. 2013), take advantage of the low barrier to entry to different 
app categories and utilize available development tools for apps in different categories (Lee and 
Raghu 2014).  
Prior works have studied diversification strategy in different industrial contexts. Stern and 
Henderson (2004) study the effect of firms’ within-industry diversification on the likelihood of 
firms’ survival for US personal computer manufacturers. They find that in the constantly changing 
environment of personal computer industry where competitors release a high number of new 
products, releasing products outside the primary product line reduces the likelihood of failure 
(Stern and Henderson 2004). In the context of microcomputer software, Cotrell and Nault (2004) 
find that producing a new product into a new category or a new platform correlates with improved 
firm survival. However, if the firm does not appeal to new sets of customer needs, the new product 
cannibalizes the old ones and can reduce the probability of firm survival (Cottrell and Nault 2004).  
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	In the packaged software market, Tanriverdi and Lee (2008) find that related diversification 
across platforms and across software product-markets complement each other and when the two 
strategies are implemented in combination, it improves sales growth and market share. However, 
only implementing one of the two strategies has a negative effect on the vendor’s performance. 
They define product-market relatedness as the extent to which different products serve the needs 
of the same set of customers (Tanriverdi and Lee 2008). In contrast,  the mobile app market is 
different from the traditional packaged software market in that online users are much more likely 
to purchase niche items (Brynjolfsson et al. 2011), providing incentives for developers to diversify 
and take advantage of the customers’ heterogeneity and release in niche segments. 
In the context of mobile app platforms, Lee and Raghu (2014) find that for app developers, 
expanding app offering across categories has greater practical significance.  In their study, Lee and 
Raghu capture category popularity characteristics by counting the number of apps competing in a 
given app category, and examine its influence on the developer’s diversification outcome. They 
find that apps released in categories with more competing apps have relatively lower odds of 
survival.  
However, using the sheer number of apps in a category fails to account for  the two 
opposing product-market characteristics identified by Venkatramen and Lee (2004). Venkatramen 
and Lee find that in the context of video game development, game developers strive to release 
their games on the most popular platforms while seeking to avoid highly competitive segments in 
which their games may not be differentiated. They suggest that there is a trade-off in releasing 
products in product-markets characterized with varying degrees of overlap density, which can 
make the game developers face intense competition by incumbents, and dominance, which triggers 
a positive indirect network effect and offers game developers a big potential for their new games. 
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	Venkatramen and Lee suggest further investigation into this trade-off and its effects. In this study 
and in the context of mobile app development, we shed light on how the choice of app category 
given these two app category characteristics influences the diversification outcome in the context 
of mobile app platforms. 
	
4.2.2 The trade-off due to the positive network effects and competition effects 
	
In the platform markets that are characterized by network effects, network effects can play a role 
in influencing the strategy of market participants and their performance. In a platform market, an 
intermediary (platform) enables exchanges between two or more sides of the market (Eisenmann 
et al. 2006; Katz and Shapiro 1985; Rochet and Tirole 2003). Due to presence of positive indirect 
network effects, the net utility for participants on one side of the market increases as the participants 
on the other side of the market increases (Eisenmann et al. 2006; Rochet and Tirole 2006). On the 
mobile app platforms, the positive indirect effect for app developers is observed as they experience 
increasing return an increase in the number of users and the demand on the users’ side.  The  
competition effect, on the other hand, decreases the net utility for participants on one side of the 
market as there are more participants on the same side of the market (Eisenmann et al. 2006; 
Huotari 2017; Porch et al. 2015). Eisenman et al suggest that platform owners must be cautious 
about the strong effect of competition, as sellers on a platform prefer to see fewer direct rivals. On 
mobile app platforms, for instance, as there are more dominant app developers, the competition 
becomes more intense and app developers prefer to avoid facing such an intense competition with 
incumbents. 
The interaction between positive indirect network effects and competition effects and their 
impact on platform dynamics have been studied in different contexts. Markovich and Moenius 
(2009) analytically model how the software firms select the hardware platform to release their 
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	products and argue that the firms’ incentive to invest and compete in quality upgrades is driven by 
two forces: making the hardware platform more attractive to draw more users to the platform 
(strengthening positive indirect network effect), and competing against other firms on the same 
platform (counteracting competition effect). As the quality difference between platforms increases, 
the incentive to strengthen the indirect network effect on the superior platform decreases. 
Similarly, when the quality difference between software products on one platform increases, the 
incentive for a software firm to compete by quality upgrades and hamper the competition effect 
decreases. 
In the context of electronic markets, the clash of the positive indirect network effect and 
competition effect has been studied by examining the timing of listing products for sale by eBay 
sellers (Simonsohn 2010). The sellers try to sell their items in the evening time slot, as they neglect 
the competition due to an excess in number of sellers and are lured by the increased demand in the 
evening time. The findings suggest that selling products at the peak time exhibits lower selling 
rates and prices, which is because these sellers focus on the aggregated demand for their products, 
rather than the residual demand after accounting for the competition.  
In the context of app development for handheld computer platforms, the tension between 
competition effect and positive indirect network effect and their influence on the innovation 
incentives of app developers has been studied (Boudreau 2012). While encouraging a large number 
of independent developers to develop for a computer platform has become a norm in platform 
businesses in an effort to increase innovation and variety of apps (due to an indirect network 
effect), this approach may in fact hinder innovation due to heightened competition and a 
congestion of developers (competition effect). The results show that competition effect 
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	overwhelms a positive indirect network effect and an over-all crowding-out of innovation is 
observed.  
The platform’s sustained competitive advantage is also influenced by the tension between 
competition effects and positive indirect network effects. The results of an agent based simulation 
model shows that overcrowding of sellers on a platform causes a competition effect that can 
prevent a platform sustaining the competitive advantage it has gained due to large installed base 
and positive indirect network effect (Huotari 2017). In another study, Li at el. study the developer’s 
entry decision into a mobile app category by accounting for the positive indirect network effect 
due to the number of existing developers (2014). This study finds that the size of the user base has 
a positive relationship with the developer’s entry decision to a mobile app category, and that the 
number of existing developers has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the entry.  
The trade-off between the positive indirect network effect and the competition effect can 
also influence the developers’ performance when they release their app into an app category. In 
this study, we focus on how category popularity (due to a positive indirect network effect) and 
category concentration (due to a competition effect) can influence the developers’ performance. 
 
4.2.3 Hypotheses development 
	
Prior works in the mobile app industry have explored the effects of these category characteristics 
on developer’s diversification performance.  Lee and Raghu find that developers’ diversification 
into “less popular” as opposed to “more popular” categories improves developers’ performance 
(2014). They rely on an industry report’s classification of categories into less popular and more 
popular ones, based on the percentage of the apps in a category relative to the entire platform. 
Theoretically, however, the number of apps in a category can indicate its popularity, but may also 
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	signal strong competition within the category. Therefore, it is important to distinguish these two 
category characteristics and examine how the underlying dynamics of network effects influence 
the diversification-performance relationship. 
In order to identify and account for the competition effect on the developers’ performance, 
we examine the concentration of competition in an app category.  In a concentrated category, 
where strong incumbents dominate the market, it may be more difficult for a developer to stand 
out in the competition and gain a large market share. Therefore, due to a congestion of developers 
and competition effects, developing for these categories may hinder improvement to developer’s 
performance by negatively affecting the app’s adoption.  
H1: All else being equal, the degree of market concentration of the app category is 
negatively associated with the app’s number of downloads.  
 
On the other hand, in order to account for the positive indirect network effect that the app 
developers can exploit, we consider the size of the demand for a given app category as category 
popularity. As there is a larger demand for an app category, the developers benefit from a larger 
user base. A larger user base increases the odds that an app developer can recover the fixed costs 
of developing apps. This can be a source of indirect network effects, creating positive feedback 
and increasing the potential return on investment. Therefore, developing for a category with 
more popularity will positively affect the app’s adoption.  
H2: All else being equal, the degree of market popularity of the app category is positively 
associated with the app’s number of downloads 
 
Based on these two characteristics, each category can be represented on a two-dimensional 
diagram that consist of the category concentration and category popularity axes. In this study, 
category concentration is measured as HHI (the Herfindahl-Hirschman index), a widely adopted 
measure of competition. A larger HHI value indicates higher market concentration and stronger 
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	presence of incumbents. Category popularity is measured as sum of number of downloads for the 
top apps in the category. Based on the data collected for 12 categories, Figure 16 shows how these 
categories are dispersed along these two dimensions. 
 
 
	
Figure 16. Dispersion of categories in the popularity-HHI dimensions 
(*The dotted lines are drawn at the median value for log(popularity) and log(HHI)) 
 
Further, the effect of these two category characteristics may interact with each other. That 
is, the extent to which the developers can exploit the positive indirect network effects and the high 
popularity of a category positively influences the app’s performance, may depend on the extent to 
which strong incumbents are present in the same category. Similarly, the extent to which the 
presence of a strong incumbent and high concentration of an app category negatively influences 
the app’s performance depends on the size of the demand for the apps in that app category. 
As the category popularity and category concentration influence the developers’ 
performance, it is unclear whether the category popularity that is associated with a larger demand 
size would make up for the negative effect of category concentration and therefore improve an 
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	app’s performance; or that the negative effect of category concentration would overwhelm the 
positive impact of category popularity and negatively influence the app’s performance. To test the 
relative effect of category concentration and category popularity, we hypothesize that: 
 
H3a: All else being equal, the negative effect of market concentration of the app category 
is stronger than the positive effect of market popularity of the app category  
 
H3b: All else being equal, the positive effect of market popularity of the app category is 
stronger than the negative effect of market concentration of the app category  
 
 
 
4.3 DATA AND MEASURES 
 
4.3.1 Sample  
	
To test our hypotheses, we collected data for app developers, both new and those with previously 
released apps, and their mobile apps from the leading Android platform Google Play. On Google 
Play, both free and paid apps are categorized and ranked within each category. These Top Free 
apps and Top Paid ranking lists consist of the top 504 apps in their respective group based on their 
market performance. These lists allow us to measure the two category characteristics we are 
focusing on in this study. Google Play curates the Top Free and Top Paid apps for 12 app 
categories: Art & Design, Auto & Vehicles, Beauty, Books & References, Comics, Dating, Events, 
Libraries & Demo, Maps & Navigation, Medical, Parenting, Video Players & Editors. Thus, we 
focus on new apps released in these app categories to examine the effect of category characteristics 
on developers’ diversification outcomes.  Focusing on the new apps allows us to evaluate the effect 
of category characteristics, as we can collect data on these category characteristics at the time the 
new app is released. 
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	In order to create a sample of new apps released in our list of categories, we collect weekly 
data from App Brain, a leading source of information about the Android ecosystem1 , which 
provides a comprehensive summary of the activity of Android mobile apps. The rich data provided 
by this website has also been utilized in previous studies (Liu et al. 2015).  The weekly data 
collection of new apps span across an 8-week period in October and November of 2017, where we 
identify 1157 new apps released. For each of these apps, we also identify the developer and collect 
data on the developers’ characteristics.  
For the sample of our apps, we run a longitudinal weekly data collection on each app and 
its developer. We ran this data collection on AppBrain for a 10-week period from October 2017 to 
December 2017, creating a panel dataset with 10,026 observations for 1157 apps2. For each app, 
we collected the weekly data on the following variables: estimated number of downloads, type of 
pricing (free vs. paid), app category, and the developer’s name. For the developer, we collected 
the weekly data on the developer’s number of apps and the average user review rating across all 
apps.  
For each app, we also collected data on the list of top apps in the app’s category in the 
week the app was released. For example, for a free app released in the Comics category in the 
second week of November, we collected the list of all the apps in the Top Free apps in the Comics 
category in the second week of November as curated by Google Play. If the app was paid, we 
collected the data from the Top Paid apps. For each app in the list, then, we collected the estimated 
number of downloads in the second week of November from AppBrain. Using the number of 
																																																						
1 https://www.appbrain.com 
2 Note that this is not a balanced panel, since apps were released in different weeks and our data 
collection window for the new apps was ten weeks.  
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	downloads for all the apps in the list, we then develop measures for category popularity and 
category concentration. This part of our data collection adds a cross-sectional observation for each 
app in our dataset, measuring the category popularity and category concentration in the week the 
app was released.  
 
4.3.2 Variables and measurement 
	
For the majority of our variables on the apps and the developers we use the data as they were 
collected from AppBrain. The dependent variable in this study, the number of downloads for the 
app released by a developer, is collected weekly from AppBrain. While on Google Play the exact 
number of downloads for apps is not available and instead a range of download counts are 
presented3, AppBrain uses its pool of data to estimate the number of downloads for each app.  Use 
of the estimated downloads allow us to better evaluate the performance of the apps. Further, as the 
number of downloads is right-skewed, we use a logarithmic transformation to make it 
approximately symmetrically distributed. 
For the independent variables of interest in this study, we develop measures of category 
popularity and category concentration. For this purpose, we rely on the data on list of top apps 
collected from Google Play and the estimated number of downloads for those apps collected from 
AppBrain. 
To measure category popularity, we use the sum of number of downloads for all the apps 
in the top list of the apps in each category, as a proxy for the aggregated demand for the category. 
The concentration in an app category is measured by computing HHI, a measure of market 
																																																						
3 Google Play lists the number of downloads for the apps in one of 11 range categories: 
10-50,50-100,100-500, 500-1,000- 1,000–5,000, 5,000–10,000, 10,000–50,000, 50,000–100,000, 
100,000–500,000, 500,000–1,000,000, 1,000,000–5,000,000    
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	concentration. A larger value of HHI indicates strong presence of incumbents and an intense 
competition, while a smaller value of HHI indicates less intense competition with many smaller 
firms. To compute HHI for a category, we calculate the market share of each app as a percentage 
of its number of downloads to the total number of downloads for all the apps in that category.  We 
then use the following formula to compute HHI:  
CategoryHHI = (market	share	for	each	app)0  
 
Table 20 provides definitions of the key variables and control variables used in our analyses, and 
Table 21 presents the descriptive statistics. 
Table 20. Definition of Key Variables 
Variable Definition 
Log(AppDownloads)i,t The log of number of times app i has been downloaded (purchased) on week t. 
CategoryHHIi Category concentration for the app i in the week the app is released 
CategoryPopularityi Category popularity for the app i in the week the app is released 
AppAgei,t The age of the app i (in weeks) on week t 
DeveloperRatingi,t The average of user review rating across all the apps developed by the developer of app i on week t 
DeveloperNumAppi,t The number of apps developed by the developer of app i on week t 
 
 
Table 21. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Log(AppDownloads)i,t 3.87 2.37 0 13.12 
CategoryHHIi (scaled in 100) 6.95 5.24 1.35 50.57 
CategoryPopularityi (scaled in 1m) 23.33 44.01 .0001 172.56 
AppAgei,t 6.48 2.72 1 14 
DeveloperRatingi,t 3.08 1.53 0 5 
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	DeveloperNumAppsi,t 8.23 6.44 1 26 
 
 
 
4.4 ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ESTIMATION RESULTS 
	
4.4.1 Econometric models 
	
To evaluate the proposed hypotheses, we construct two econometric models. In both models, the 
dependent variable is the log of number of downloads for a newly released app. The category HHI 
(scaled in 100) and category popularity (scaled in 1m) are the key independent variables. In our 
second model, we create an interaction term for the two category characteristics to evaluate the 
expected presence of an interaction effect between the two. 
 
Log(AppDownloads)i,t = a0 +a1 CategoryHHIi +a2 CategoryPopularityi + a3 AppAgei,t +a4 
DeveloperRatingi,t + a5 DeveloperNumAppsi,t + ei,t 
Model 1 
Log(AppDownloads)i,t = b0 + 
b1 CategoryHHIi +b2 CategoryPopularityi +b3 CategoryHHIi *  CategoryPopularityi +   
b4 AppAgei,t +b5  DeveloperRatingi,t + b6 DeveloperNumAppsi,t + ei,t 
Model 2 
 
Due to the panel nature of our dataset, we examine our model for specification error and 
violations of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation assumptions so that we can make appropriate 
adjustments. We run tests for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The result of the White’s test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the variances for the errors are constant, suggesting the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. This is consistent with the visual inspection of the residuals which shows an 
increase in the residual variance as the fitted values increase. We further perform the Wooldridge 
test for autocorrelation in the panel data. The result shows that the null hypothesis of absence of 
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	first-order autocorrelation (AR1) is rejected, suggesting presence of AR1 in our data set. This is 
expected given the longitudinal nature of our data. Given the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
AR1 autocorrelation in our models, we adopt the generalized least squares (GLS), estimator and 
use robust standard errors that account for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
4.4.2 Estimation results 
	
To evaluate the effect of category characteristics on developers’ diversification outcome, in model 
1 we regress log(AppDownloads) on the CategoryHHI and CategoryPopularity, controlling for 
the app’s age, and the developer’s number of apps and average user review ratings across all apps. 
As shown in Table 22, the coefficients for the CategoryHHI (a1) and CategoryPopularity (a2) are 
both significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient for CategoryHHI is negative, which suggests 
that as the category in which the developer releases an app is more concentrated, the app is less 
successful in acquiring more downloads, thus supporting H1.  
Since the dependent variable of both models adopts a log-linear form, the result shows that 
a 100-unit increase in the CategoryHHI corresponds to approximately 4.2% expected decrease in 
the number of downloads for the app. The coefficient for CategoryPopularity, on the other hand, 
is positive. This positive coefficient supports H2 and shows that all else being equal, when the 
developer releases an app in a more popular category, the app will have a higher number of 
downloads than if it was released in a less popular category. The size of the coefficient suggests 
that a one-million-unit increase in category popularity corresponds to a 1.2% increase in the 
number of downloads for the app. Further, post-estimation test on the difference between a1 and 
a2 shows a significant difference between the two coefficients (c2 (1) = 23.16, p<0.01), supporting 
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	the hypothesis that the negative effect of the CategoryHHI is significantly stronger than the 
positive effect of CategoryPopularity, hence H3a is supported and H3b is rejected. 
Table 22. Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: 
log(AppDownloads) 
Model 1: 
GLS Estimation 
 (No interaction) 
Model 2a: 
GLS Estimation 
(With Interaction) 
CategoryHHI (scaled 
in 100) 
-0.042** 
(0.011) 
 
-.129** 
(0.030) 
CategoryPopularity 
(scaled in 1m) 
0.012** 
(0.001) 
.033** 
(0.006) 
CategoryHHI* 
CategoryPopularity 
 -01.223** 
(0.345) 
AppAge i,t 0.211** 
(0.006) 
0.211** 
(0.006) 
DeveloperRating i,t 0.331** 
(0.031) 
0.331** 
(0.031) 
DeveloperNumApps i,t 0.043** 
(0.008) 
0.041* 
(0.009) 
Constant 1.186** 
(0.146) 
1.687** 
(0.222) 
Fit statistic (Wald c2) 1420.85** 1427.77** 
a In model 2, both CategoryHHI and CategoryPopularity are centered to 
create the interaction term. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01. 
 
In model 2, we include the interaction effect of the two category characteristics in the 
specification. To result shows a significant and negative interaction between CategoryHHI and 
CategoryPopularity in influencing the number of downloads for a new app. Since both 
CategoryHHI and CategoryPopularity are continuous variables, the inclusion of the interaction 
term of these two variables makes our model prone to multicollinearity. To avoid this threat, we 
center the original interacting variables before computing the interaction term. For the centered 
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	variables, the mean is zero. This approach makes the interpretation of our results more 
straightforward and also greatly reduces the correlation between the interaction term and original 
variables.  
The result of model 2 shows that the interaction between CategoryHHI and 
CategoryPopularity is significant and negative, and that consistent with model 1, there is a 
significant negative effect of CategoryHHI and a significant positive effect of CategoryPopularity 
on the number of downloads for an app released in a given category. For CategoryHHI, a 100-unit 
increase at the expected value of CategoryPopularity corresponds to a 12.9% decrease in the 
number of downloads, supporting H1. Spporting H2, a one-million-unit increase in 
CategoryPopularity at the expected value of CategoryHHI correlates with 3.3% increase in the 
number of downloads. The negative interaction of CategoryHHI and CategoryPopularity suggests 
that as a category becomes more popular, the negative effect of CategoryHHI becomes stronger. 
Similarly, as the category becomes more concentrated, the positive effect of CategoryPopularity 
diminishes. To evaluate H3a and H3b, we ran a post-hoc test of the coefficients for CategoryHHI 
and CategoryPopularity, and we found that the two coefficients are significantly different from 
each other (c2 (1) = 20.81, p<0.01). This result supports H3a and rejects H3b, showing that the 
negative effect of CategoryHHI would outweigh the positive effect of CategoryPopularity. 
 
4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
	
	
In this study, we conduct an empirical analysis to address the question of whether the 
characteristics of app categories, category concentration and category popularity,  into which an 
app developer diversifies by releasing an app influences the number of downloads for the app and 
hence the performance of the developer. As we investigated the negative effect of category 
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	concentration and the positive influence of category popularity on the app’s performance, we also 
focused on which of the two forces will prevail. 
The results show that when deciding on which app category to develop for, developers 
should account for category concentration and category popularity. We find support for H1, which 
predicts that releasing an app in a category with higher category concentration will have a negative 
impact on the app’s downloads. On average, a 100-unit increase in HHI will reduce the app’s 
number of downloads by about 12.9%. As discussed earlier, this negative impact is due to the fact 
that as strong incumbents dominate the competition in an app category, it becomes harder for new 
apps to stand out and attract users’ attention. While some developers may find it intriguing to 
develop apps for categories where established apps are present to enjoy a possible spillover effect, 
our results suggest the opposite outcome due to the market power of strong incumbents.  
Our results also provide support for H2, that category popularity has a positive influence 
on an app’s performance. The interaction effect shows that the negative impact of category 
concentration is even stronger for the categories that have higher popularity. Because even though 
the high popularity means a bigger pie for everyone, the absolute loss due to the strong incumbents 
taking a bigger share of the same pie is larger in a highly concentrated category. Therefore, 
considering the positive effect of popularity, the developers should practice caution by considering 
the effect of category concentration. Although on average higher popularity increases the app’s 
estimated downloads, this does not hold when the category is highly concentrated. For categories 
with low concentration, higher popularity has a positive impact on the app’s performance. But 
when the category becomes concentrated and the HHI becomes larger than 710, an increase in 
popularity will in fact reduce the app’s number of downloads. This finding is in line with the results 
supporting H3a, that the negative influence of category concentration would overwhelm the 
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	positive impact of category popularity. This is also consistent with prior findings in other contexts 
on how crowdedness can create a glut of complementors, thereby suppressing innovation and 
reducing sales volume. In the mobile app context, we shed light on the two opposing characteristics 
that can influence the developers’ diversification outcome differently, rather than relying on a 
single measure of the number of developers in an app category used in prior works. This is very 
illuminating given the dilemma the developers often face: either embrace the higher popularity or 
avoid the higher concentration.  
The implication of our study can help developers diversifying their app offerings or 
releasing their first app with their choice of app category. By highlighting the importance of app 
category characteristics, our findings suggest that if developers are to choose between categories 
with low concentration, among those the categories with higher popularity will have the most 
positive influence on the app’s performance. In such categories, the high popularity will enable 
the developers to exploit the positive indirect network effects and improve their performance by 
absorbing more demand from the pool of users. However, if developers are to choose between 
categories with high concentration, they are better off if they choose a category with lower 
popularity. This is because in categories with lower popularity, the dominance of the strong 
incumbents is more fragile, leaving room for new apps to compete against them. In categories with 
high concentration and high popularity, the strong incumbents are enjoying a strong and 
established dominance, making it even harder for developers to stand out.    
 
Our study contributes to the literature on app developers’ performance and strategic 
decision making, platform competition strategy and diversification strategy. We inform the 
literature on how diversification of app developers can be influenced by the characteristics of the 
app categories. Future work can tease out other prominent app category characteristics that can 
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	play a role in developers’ diversification outcomes. Further, this study contributes to the platform 
strategy literature by focusing on the competition among complementors. While there is a rich 
stream of research studying the competition between platforms, we contribute to this literature by 
evaluating the competitive strategies adopted by platform complementors (i.e. app developers) and 
how the positive indirect network effect and competition effect may oppose each other and 
differentially influence the complementors’ performance. Further, as platforms compete with each 
other, the nature of competition within those platforms and among their complementors can be 
decisive of the platforms’ evolution and success. Therefore, more research on the platforms’ 
complementors competitive strategies can be instrumental in this line of research.  
 
 
102
5.0 CONCLUSION 
 
 
As the platform business model is becoming widely adopted, the world of business is 
witnessing a surge in the emergence of digital platform businesses. Digital platforms create 
value by enabling interaction and exchanges between platform participants on two (or 
more) sides of the market, often referred to as complementors and consumers. As digital 
platforms strive to gain the edge by adopting myriads of competitive strategies, one 
characteristic that can influence their efforts and strategic decision making is the presence 
of network effects. 
Digital platforms are characterized by both direct and indirect network effects. With 
a positive direct network effect, joining more participants on one side increases the value 
for other participants on the same side. Direct network effects can also take a negative 
form, when the presence of more participants on one side decreases the value for the 
participants on the same side. With a positive indirect network effect, as more participants 
join one side of the platform, the participants on the other side can gain a higher value.  
Network effects can be a significant source of influence on the competition in the 
world of platforms, where competition may take place between the platforms, between the 
complementors participating on the platforms, and in some cases between a platform and 
its complementors. Therefore, both platforms and the complementors need to acknowledge 
network effects as they focus on their strategic decision making, try to utilize positive 
network effects and practice caution in dealing with negative network effects. In the three 
essays of this dissertation, we have studied competitive strategies for digital platform 
business and have considered the role of network effects as a driving force. 
The first essay, a study in the context of videogame consoles, we have focused on 
how multi-homing of videogame developers can weaken the indirect network effects and 
lead to a Winners-Take-Some (WTS) outcome competition outcome. This WTS outcome 
is typically not expected in the market for platforms, where a Winner-Takes-All (WTA) 
outcome often emerges due to the strength of indirect network effects. We analyzed three 
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hand-collected data sets on video games across classes of video game consoles and found 
a consistent, increasing pattern of multi-homing among the most popular video games. In 
the most recently concluded video game console competition that resulted in a WTS 
outcome, we find that 65% of the most popular games are multi-homing. We have argued 
why we observe this change in the multi-homing behavior of videogame developers and 
how it can mitigate indirect network effects and pave the way for a WTS outcome.  
In the second essay, we turn our focus to a competitive strategy that content platform 
businesses can adopt to improve their performance, which is improving the design of the 
platform. As an emerging success metric for content platforms, we argued for the 
importance of user engagement and discovery. With improved user engagement one side 
content platforms can exploit a positive indirect network effect. We focused on using 
popularity information signals as a social design element to invoke the desired user 
behavior. In a field experiment in the context of a music mobile app platform we evaluated 
the effect of conflicting popularity information signals on user engagement. We found that 
for users who are exposed to conflicting information signals, their engagement and 
discovery is greater than for those users who are exposed to aligned popularity information 
signals.   
In the third essay, and in the context of mobile app platforms, we analyzed hand-
collected panel data of mobile app developers’ diversification strategies and the 
performance of their newly released apps to evaluate the effect of mobile app categories 
on the apps’ performance. We focused on the two mobile app category characteristics that 
are believed to be driven by network effects and competition effects: popularity of the 
mobile app category that can positively influence a mobile app’s performance (due to 
positive indirect network effects), and the concentration mobile app category that can 
negatively influence a mobile app’s performance (due to a negative competition effect). 
We found support for the hypotheses that both characteristics influence a mobile app’s 
performance, and that the negative effect of category concentration overwhelms the 
positive effect of category popularity.  
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As proposed and tested in these essays, we observe a significant influence of 
network effects on competition in the world of platforms. As digital platform businesses 
are growing, both in number and in importance in the business world, the relevance of 
studying the challenges and dynamics of competition in the presence of network effects is 
on the rise. We contribute to our understating of how platforms and complementors can 
make better strategic decisions and account for network effects as they strive to gain 
competitive advantage.  
Moving forward, we can build on the three essays in this dissertation to further our 
understanding of competition for platform owners and platform complementors. Given the 
emergence of WTS outcome in some platform markets, it will be worthwhile to study how 
similar outcome may arise in other contexts, such as the market for content platforms. This 
is because platform owners’ strategies depend on whether they are to compete for the 
market to become the market leader, or compete in the market to be one of the players with 
enough market share to survive and succeed.  The second chapter of this dissertation has 
focused on a platform market where the platform owners (i.e. video game console 
platforms) enable the exchange of physical goods (i.e. video games) and it involves a 
monetary transaction between the seller and buyer. On a content platform, on the other 
hand, platform owners enable the exchange of content and the focus is more on 
consumption, rather than purchase. In these platforms, the switching cost may be higher 
due to users customizing their consumption on the platforms (e.g. creating playlists of 
songs on a music platform). Varying levels of switching costs between content platforms 
depending on whether conversion tools between these customizations are available can 
differently influence the market outcome. For these content platforms, we can study what 
other factors such as switching costs can influence the market outcome and under what 
conditions an emergence of WTS can be expected.  
Additionally, studying the competition dynamics within a given platform can also 
shed light on within-platform competitions. Understanding the dynamics of competition 
within and between app categories on a mobile app platform, for instance, can inform app 
developers on adopting appropriate competitive strategies. We can apply an ecological 
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theory to study the within and between category competitions. In ecology, individuals 
within a species compete with each other for resources (e.g. food). There is also a 
competition between species as there might be an overlap in the required resources for 
different species. Similarly, mobile apps compete with each other within an app category. 
For example, all the apps in the “Books” category compete with each other. Additionally, 
apps in a category and as a group compete with mobile apps from other app categories. For 
example, apps in the “Books” category compete with the apps in the “News” category. The 
later competition is due to the fact that users have limited physical storage on their phones 
and limited attention span for different kinds of apps. These competition dynamics within 
an app category and between the app categories can have implications for the strategies 
adopted by mobile app developers. For example, more compatibility between apps in the 
“Books” category can make the “Books” category more attractive to the users compared to 
the “News” category. But this compatibility might make it harder for the apps in the 
“Books” category to compete with each other. Therefore, by accounting for both within 
and between category competition, app developers can adopt more appropriate strategies. 
Moreover, as platform owners and platform complementors compete for growth and 
competitive advantage, it is important to account for emerging success metrics and study 
how they can be improved. In the second essay of this dissertation we have studied how 
content platforms can improve user engagement as an emerging success metric by using 
social design features and including popularity information signals. While the user 
engagement may be an appropriate success metric in other platform contexts as well (e.g. 
video game console platforms, mobile app platforms), further work can study how this 
construct can be measured in such contexts. For video games, for instance, the micro-
transactions that consists of with-in game purchases (e.g. purchasing in-game currencies, 
items, and random chances) can be used to measure user engagement. Further research can 
shed light on the choice of appropriate strategies for these platforms to improve such 
measures of user engagement.  
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To conclude, the three essays in this dissertation contribute to our understating of 
competition in the world of platforms by studying competitive strategies for both platform 
owners and platform developers, and the effectiveness of such strategies. The research 
questions addressed in this dissertation open up avenues of further inquiries to make broad 
contributions to both scientific literature and platform businesses.  
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